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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS AND THE 
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES ON THE BASIS 
OF NATIONALITY 
MILAN MARKOVIC∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Judges who sit on the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) and other 
international criminal tribunals (“ICTs”) are nationals of particular 
states and are elected to serve largely on the basis of their nationality. 
Since the advent of the Nuremberg Tribunal, however, ICTs have 
perpetuated the notion that national identity is irrelevant to a judge’s 
performance of his or her duties.  
This Article will contend that judges at the ICC and other ICTs should 
not preside over trials concerning crimes allegedly committed by or 
against their fellow nationals. Judges should also consider recusing 
themselves from cases that strongly implicate the interests of their home 
nations. Other international tribunals prohibit judges from adjudicating 
cases involving their home nations or otherwise control for national bias 
in judging. 
Judges at the ICC and other ICTs undoubtedly strive to be independent 
and impartial, but they cannot be expected to act as representatives of the 
international community and its values in cases where they will be under 
psychological and economic pressure to rule in accordance with domestic 
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interests. The parties to a conflict are also likely to use a judge’s 
nationality as a proxy for his or her capacity to be impartial.  
INTRODUCTION 
International criminal trials have changed significantly since 
Nuremberg. Individuals that appear before modern international criminal 
tribunals (“ICTs”) such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(“ICTR”), and International Criminal Court (“ICC”) possess far more 
rights and protections than did the Nuremberg defendants.1 As one 
prominent international judge has stated, “while the Nuremberg Tribunal 
was hardly a failure from the perspective of due process rights, its 
shortcomings inspired its heirs to do better, and the result is a rigorous 
commitment to due process across the international criminal courts.”2 
ICTs are now generally perceived to provide defendants with rights that 
equal—or exceed—those provided by domestic courts.3   
To ensure that defendants’ rights are protected and to protect the 
credibility of international criminal trials, all modern ICTs also require 
judges to be independent and impartial.4 Whereas the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal did not address the qualifications of judges, 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, A Critique of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, 25 DEN. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 305, 305–06 (1997) (comparing the Nuremberg Tribunal to the ICTY and 
concluding that “[i]n many respects, the Yugoslavia Tribunal is a vast improvement over its 
predecessor”); Michael Newton, Evolving Equality: The Development of the International Defense 
Bar, 47 STAN. J. INT’L L. 379, 385 (2011) (“The modern defense bar has . . . evolved to provide 
defendants with trial procedures and organizational support necessary to fully preserve their due 
process rights.”). The Nuremberg Tribunal permitted trials in absentia, applied ex post facto laws, and 
did not afford defendants the right to appeal their convictions. See generally Kevin R. Chaney, Pitfalls 
and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of Nuremberg to the Yugoslavia War Crimes Trials, 14 DICK. J. 
INT’L L. 57, 71–78 (1995) (identifying the main criticisms of the Nuremberg trials).  
 2. Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 
100 AM. J. INT’L L. 551, 571 (2006). 
 3. See, e.g., Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. 
INT’L L. 925, 927 (2008) (“[International criminal law] is scrupulously generous in the guarantee of 
procedural rights, and succeeds in upholding them even for the most unsavory accused.”); Letter from 
Monroe Leigh, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson, to Henry Hyde, Chairman of the H. Comm. on Int’l 
Relations (Feb. 21, 2001) (suggesting that the protections of the ICC Statute are “at least as 
comprehensive as the American Bill of Rights—in certain cases even more detailed and specific”), 
reprinted in Philippe Kirsch, Applying the Principles of Nuremberg in the International Criminal 
Court, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 501, 505–06 (2007). 
 4. See Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the 
Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 271–72 (2003); Tom Dannenbaum, 
Nationality and the International Judge: The Nationalist Presumption Governing the International 
Judiciary and Why It Must Be Reversed, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 77, 107 (2012). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/5
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and prohibited any challenges to the composition of the Tribunal,5 the 
statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC contain provisions concerning 
judicial independence and impartiality.6 ICC judges are subject to a code 
of ethical conduct that further delineates their obligations of independence 
and impartiality.7 
Despite the attention to defendants’ rights and judicial independence 
and impartiality, defendants who seek to disqualify judges from 
international criminal trials face a high bar. The ICTY affords judges a 
“presumption of impartiality,” and the defendant “must firmly establish a 
reasonable apprehension of bias.”8 ICTR defendants must make a similar 
showing to disqualify a judge.9  
ICTs have been especially unreceptive to claims that a judge’s 
nationality can provide a basis for his or her disqualification.10 In 
responding to a motion to disqualify a German judge on the basis of “a 
long history of conflict between Germans and Serbs,”11 the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber found that:  
The nationalities . . . of Judges of this Tribunal are, and must be, 
irrelevant to their ability to hear the cases before them 
impartially . . . . [J]udges’ ability to . . . consider nothing but the 
evidence presented to them in deciding on an individual’s guilt 
constitutes a touchstone of their role as judges.12 
 
 
 5. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 3, Aug. 8, 1945, 56 Stat. 1544, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter IMT Charter]. 
 6. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 41(2)(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter ICC Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
S.C. Res 827, art. 13, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 12, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) 
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
 7. ICC, Code of Judicial Ethics, arts. 3 & 4, Res. ICC‐BD/02‐01‐05 (Mar. 9, 2005), available at 
http://www.icc‐cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A62EBC0F‐D534‐438F‐A128‐D3AC4CFDD644/140141/ICCBD 
020105_En.pdf. 
 8. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 196–97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000). 
 9. François Karera v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-74-A, Judgment, ¶ 254 (Feb. 2, 2009); 
Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Judgment, ¶ 42 
(May 26, 2003); Prosecutor v. Nourain & Jamus, ICC-02/05-03/09-344-Anx, Decision of the Plenary 
of the Judges on the “Defence Request for the Disqualification of a Judge” of 2 April 2012. 
 10. See Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Motion for Disqualification, ¶ 3 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2003) [hereinafter Seselj Disqualification 
Decision]; Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, A Report to the Vice-President Pursuant to 
Rule 15(b)(ii) Concerning Defence Motion to Disqualify Judge Schomburg from Sitting on Appeal, at 
3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 19, 2007).   
 11. Seselj Disqualification Decision, ¶ 2.  
 12. Id. ¶ 3; see also id. ¶ 4 (“The policies of the governments of the countries from which judges 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
4 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:1 
 
 
 
 
Similarly, when the defense team of General Ratko Mladić sought to 
disqualify Judge Alfonse Orie on, among other grounds, the grounds that 
the indictment against Mladić predominately focused on the Srebrenica 
massacre, and Judge Orie “could not detach himself from his Dutch 
nationality, and the sentiments that may rise from such a charged 
proceeding on a matter that is of great interest to the Dutch State and 
people,”13 its motion was dismissed in a three-page decision.14 The 
decision was predicated on a memorandum filed in the matter by Judge 
Orie, in which he responded to the charge of national bias as follows: 
I am a national of the Netherlands. I was elected as a judge of this 
Tribunal by the General Assembly of the United Nations. I am 
remunerated for my work for this Tribunal by the United Nations. 
In no way do I feel or consider that I have any identification or 
partiality with the Netherlands, its Government, any of its officials, 
or any individual of Dutch nationality in the performance of my 
duties. What binds me is the solemn declaration that I made when I 
undertook to fulfill my duties “honourably, faithfully, impartially 
and conscientiously.”15  
The ICTY may be correct that a judge should not be disqualified from 
an international criminal trial because his or her nation has been a 
historical antagonist of the defendant’s nation. A Dutch judge may also be 
capable of impartially presiding over a case involving the Srebrenica 
massacre, notwithstanding the impact that Dutch peacekeepers’ failure to 
protect Srebrenica’s civilians has had on the Netherlands and its people.16 
 
 
of the International Tribunal come are, and must be, irrelevant to the carrying out of their judicial 
responsibilities.”). 
 13. Prosecutor v. Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-PT, Defence Motion Pursuant to Rule 15(B) 
Seeking Disqualification of Presiding Judge Alphons Orie and for a Stay of Proceedings, ¶ 96 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 11, 2012).  
 14. See Prosecutor v. Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-PT, Order Denying Defence Motion Pursuant 
to Rule 15(B) Seeking Disqualification of Presiding Judge Alphons Orie and for a Stay of 
Proceedings, at 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 15, 2012). 
 15. Id. at Annex, ¶ 60. 
 16. In 2002, the government of Prime Minister Wim Kok resigned after a report criticized it for 
failing to prevent the Srebrenica massacre. See, e.g., Dutch Government Quits Over Srebrenica, BBC 
NEWS (Apr. 16, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1933144.stm; Dutch Cabinet Resigns Over 
Srebrenica Report, TELEGRAPH (London) (Apr. 12, 2002), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1391071/ 
Dutch-cabinet-resigns-over-Srebrenica-report.html. Dutch courts have also recently found that the 
Netherlands bears responsibility for the massacre and must pay compensation to some of its victims. 
See Martin Banks, Dutch State to Blame for Srebrenica Deaths, Court Rules, TELEGRAPH (London) 
(July 5, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/8618244/Dutch-state-
to-blame-for-Srebrenica-deaths-court-rules.html. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/5
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It does not follow, however, that a judge’s national identity is irrelevant in 
every case. 
Judges possess numerous personal characteristics and background 
experiences that might affect the performance of their duties. National 
identity may not play a determinative or even significant role in the vast 
majority of international criminal trials. Nevertheless, because war crime 
trials are inherently political17 and often implicate the policies of 
governments and rebel groups,18 there will be some cases that directly 
implicate the interests of a judge’s home nation. Legal scholars and 
political scientists have begun to document the extent to which judges on 
international tribunals are biased in favor of their home states,19 and ICT 
judges are unlikely to be immune from this phenomenon.   
National bias is not merely of theoretical concern for the ICC. ICC 
judges, unlike their counterparts at the ICTY and ICTR, will preside over 
cases involving their home nations, and a Ugandan judge, Judge Nsereko, 
has already participated in an appeal involving Joseph Kony and other 
prominent members of the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”).20 
Judge Nsereko’s nationality was not addressed in the proceedings, but the 
ICC, by a majority vote of a plenary of its judges, recently denied the 
motion of two Sudanese rebels to disqualify a Nigerian judge on the basis 
that he shared the nationality of the majority of their alleged victims.21 Are 
such actions in the best interests of a court that purports to speak for the 
“international community as a whole”?22 
 
 
 17. Rosemary Byrne, The New Public International Lawyer and the Hidden Art of International 
Criminal Trial Practice, 25 CONN. J. INT’L L. 243, 253 (2010); see also Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Legal 
Ethics in International Criminal Defense, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 685, 686 (2010) (“The goals of 
international trials are broader and more political than those of ordinary domestic trials.”). 
 18. See Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial 
Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 510 (2003). 
 19. See, e.g., Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European 
Court of Human Rights, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 425 (2008) (suggesting that ECHR judges 
display national bias); Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of 
Justice Biased? 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599, 604–05 (2005) (suggesting that ICJ judges display national 
bias). 
 20. See Prosecutor v. Kony et al., Case No. ICC-02/04OA, Judgment on the “Decision on 
victims’ applications for participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06, a/0082/06, 
a/0084/06 to a/0089/06, a/0091/06 to a/0097/06, a/0099/06, a/0100/06, a/0102/06 to a/0104/06, 
a/0111/06, a/0113/06 to a/0117/06, a/0120/06, a/0121/06 and a/0123/06 to a/0127/06” of Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, ¶ 1 (Feb. 23, 2009).   
 21. See ICC, Decision of the Plenary of the Judges on the “Defence Request for the 
Disqualification of a Judge” of 2 April 2012, ICC-02/05-03/09-344-Anx, ¶ 33 (June 5, 2012). The 
judge in question also made statements that arguably appeared to be sympathetic to Sudanese 
President Al-Bashir, for whom there is an outstanding ICC warrant. See id. ¶ 26. 
 22. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1) (noting that the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to “the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”); see also Robert D. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This Article will contend that judges at the ICC and future ICTs should 
not preside over international criminal trials involving crimes allegedly 
committed by or against their fellow nationals. Judges should also 
voluntarily recuse themselves from other cases that strongly implicate the 
interests of their states. 
These rules are needed because international criminal trials have 
different functions than domestic trials, and judges should act as 
representatives of the international community as opposed to their national 
communities.23 ICT judges may strive to be impartial, but the notion that 
they can completely separate themselves from their national polities—
especially in cases involving crimes allegedly committed by, or against, 
their fellow nationals—overlooks the psychology and motivations of 
judges at the ICC and other ICTs. The parties to a conflict will also 
inevitably view a judge’s nationality as an indication of his or her 
impartiality.  
Part I of this Article will address the unique goals and purposes of 
ICTs. As scholars have observed, ICTs such as the ICC are not proxies for 
domestic judicial mechanisms and should not be seen as such.24 Rather, 
they derive their legitimacy insofar as they speak for the “international 
community as a whole”25 and “the shared values of humanity and shared 
interests of states.”26 While there will be disagreement as to what these 
values and interests are, the ICC and other ICTs should not decide cases 
on the basis of domestic values and interests. Indeed, the fact that a given 
case is before the ICC or another ICT suggests that national justice has 
proven inadequate and legitimizes the exclusion of domestic norms from 
the adjudicative process.27 
 
 
Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law 
Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 54 (2007) (“[T]he 
authority and legitimacy of international criminal tribunals derive from and rely on international rather 
than local laws and values.”). 
 23. See Sloane, supra note 22, at 55 (“Just as national criminal law conceives of crime as an 
offense against the state as a collective . . . so [international criminal law] may be conceived 
analogously as concerned principally with the penal interests and values of the international 
community as a collective, not local political and social orders.”). 
 24. See, e.g., id. at 52; Margaret M. de Guzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at 
the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 305 (2012); see also Philippe Kirsch, The 
Role of the International Criminal Court in Enforcing International Criminal Law, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 539, 543–44 (2007) (discussing the ICC’s role as a “court of last resort”). 
 25. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1). 
 26. Sloane, supra note 22, at 53. 
 27.  See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 17(1) (providing that a case is admissible where “[t]he 
case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution”). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/5
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Part II will examine why a judge’s nationality is likely to interfere with 
his or her ability to act as a representative of the international community 
in cases involving crimes allegedly committed by or against his or her 
fellow nationals. Unlike most other international tribunals, ICTs do not 
provide for nationality-based recusals, or the appointment of ad hoc judges 
who share the defendant’s nationality. Empirical research on other 
international tribunals indicates that judges disproportionately rule in favor 
of their home states, while not being influenced by geopolitical 
considerations more generally.  
Part II proceeds to describe the psychological, economic, and structural 
reasons that national bias is especially likely to exist in the adjudication of 
international criminal trials. The nature of fact-finding and legal analysis 
at the ICC and other ICTs also allows judges to give effect to their 
national biases. A dissent from a judgment in the Civilian Defense Forces 
case (“CDF case”) before the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) 
will be used to illustrate this argument.28  
Part III will consider whether this Article’s focus on nationality might 
be counterproductive to the advancement of international criminal justice 
and short-sighted given the increasing professionalization29 and 
cosmopolitanism of ICT judges.30 Part III will also seek to explain why 
removing judges from cases in which they will be perceived to have the 
most interest may actually help to legitimize international criminal trials. 
Although current ICT judges may be more professional and cosmopolitan 
than their predecessors, this does not assure that they will not exhibit 
national bias or that they will represent the international community and 
its values effectively. The Part concludes by addressing why automatic 
disqualification should be required in cases involving crimes committed 
by or against a judge’s fellow nationals as opposed to other measures.  
 
 
 28. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 1 (Aug. 2, 2007) 
[hereinafter CDF case]. As discussed infra Part II.B.3.b, the Special Court of Sierra Leone was 
designed with different goals in mind than institutions such as the ICC, and the service of domestic 
judges may have been crucial to the fulfillment of those goals. Nevertheless, the CDF case does 
suggest that it may be unrealistic to expect that judges will set aside their national interests even when 
they associate with international judges. 
 29. See generally Allison Danner & Erik Voeten, Who Is Running the International Criminal 
Justice System, in WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE? 35, 46 (Deborah D. Avant ed., 2010) (noting creation 
of a transnational network of ICT judges). 
 30. Martha Nussbaum defines “cosmopolitanism” as an individual’s tendency to see himself or 
herself as “a citizen of the world” and to “put[] right before country and universal reason before the 
symbols of belonging.” Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF 
COUNTRY? 6, 17 (Joshua Cohen & Martha Nussbaum eds., 2002); see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE 
EMPOWERED SELF: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM 1 (1999) (suggesting that 
national identities are being replaced with more individualistic identities).    
Washington University Open Scholarship
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International criminal justice is undermined when judges are 
consciously or unconsciously conflicted between their duties to the 
international community and their duties to their states. The ICC and other 
ICTs should recognize that national bias can have a significant impact on 
judging and act to protect the impartiality of international criminal trials. 
I. THE DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC 
CRIMINAL TRIALS 
To determine whether judges at the ICC and future ICTs should be 
permitted to hear cases that substantially involve their home nations, it is 
first necessary to understand the extent to which ICTs differ from 
domestic courts.     
ICTs and domestic criminal courts both determine whether punishment 
is warranted for individuals who are alleged to have committed crimes that 
fall under their jurisdictions.31 Under both systems, punishment is 
generally viewed as morally justifiable to the extent that it is either 
retributivist by reflecting what the perpetrator deserves or consequentialist 
by bringing about certain goals.32 Punishment can also have social 
meaning and significance.33    
ICTs and domestic criminal courts differ, however, with respect to the 
communities on whose behalf they act. The ICTY and ICTR were created 
by the Security Council,34 and the ICC is a treaty-based court composed of 
122 state parties.35 These ICTs all purport to act on behalf of the 
 
 
 31.  See ICC Statute, supra note 6, pmbl. (noting that  ICC jurisdiction is complementary to 
national criminal jurisdictions and that “it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction 
over those responsible for international crimes.”). 
 32. See Sloane, supra note 22, at 69 (“Conventional justifications for punishment fall into two 
broad categories: crime-control and retributive theories.”). Some law scholars have suggested that 
international criminal law is heavily skewed towards retribution. See Andrew K. Woods, Moral 
Judgments & International Crimes: The Disutility of Dessert, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 633, 634 (2012) (“The 
international criminal regime is deeply retributive.”); Ralph Henham, Developing Contextualized 
Rationales for Sentencing in International Criminal Trials, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 757, 757–58 (2007) 
(describing retributivism as a “pervading ideology” among ICTs).  
 33. Compare Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 593 
(1996) (suggesting that in the domestic context “[p]unishment . . . is a special social convention that 
signifies moral condemnation”) with Sloane, supra note 22, at 71 (“By punishing the perpetrators of 
serious international crimes . . . the international community attempts authoritatively to disavow the 
conduct, to indicate symbolically its refusal to acquiesce in the crimes.”).  
 34. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 6 (creating ICTY); S.C. Res. 935, supra note 6 (creating 
ICTR). 
 35. See List of State Parties, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states% 
20parties/ Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 
2014). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/5
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international community,36 whereas domestic criminal courts represent the 
community of a state’s citizens.37 Defendants at ICTs also stand trial for 
violating “global stability” and “global humanity” as opposed to domestic 
values and norms.38  
Of course, many ICT defendants will have allegedly violated both 
domestic and international legal norms. Across legal cultures, there is a 
great deal of overlap in the concepts of right and wrong.39 But 
notwithstanding this overlap, a particular defendant may have transgressed 
against the international community but not his or her national 
community.40 An ICT defendant’s conduct can constitute a threat to global 
stability and global humanity but appear entirely justifiable or even 
laudatory to his or her own community.41     
Some scholars, perhaps wary that ICTs can effectively speak on behalf 
of an abstract international community, have suggested that ICTs should 
seek to act as proxies of national communities.42 Support for such a view 
can be found in the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, which require judges 
to consider national penalties in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda when 
sentencing defendants.43 Moreover, pursuant to the principle of 
complementarity, the ICC can assert jurisdiction only when national 
authorities are unwilling or unable to prosecute certain crimes.44 
Adherence to this principle may suggest that the ICC and future ICTs 
 
 
 36. The ICC explicitly claims to speak on behalf of the international community. See, e.g., ICC 
Statute, supra note 6, pmbl. & art. 5(1). The ICTY and ICTR represent the international community 
because they were created by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. See 
Christian Tomuschat, International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent of Nuremberg Confirmed, 5 
CRIM. L.F. 237, 237 (1994) (“One may call it truly amazing that the international community, acting 
through the Security Council, has been able to set up two international criminal jurisdictions in the 
recent past.”). 
 37. Sloane, supra note 22, at 48.  
 38. Id. at 54 (citing MICHAEL WALZER, The Politics of Rescue, in ARGUING AGAINST WAR 74 
(2004)).  
 39. See generally Woods, supra note 32, at 648–50 (summarizing the sociological research of 
prominent punishment naturalists).  
 40. Id. at 655. 
 41. See id. at 651–52 (discussing Sierra Leoneans’ views concerning Special Court of Sierra 
Leone defendant Issa Sesay).   
 42. See, e.g., Steven Glickman, Victim’s Justice: Legitimizing the Sentencing Regime of the 
International Criminal Court, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 229, 257 (2004); Adam M. Smith, Book 
Note, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 563, 570 (2004) (reviewing FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE 
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (P. Sands ed., 2003)); see also Jenia Iontcheva Turner, 
Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 22 (2005) (suggesting that the ICC 
should defer to local jurisprudential norms). 
 43. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 24(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 23(1). The ICC 
Statute contains no such reference to national practices. Sloane, supra note 22, at 43.  
 44. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 17(1)(a). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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should strive to act on behalf of national communities that have been 
denied the opportunity to mete out justice themselves.   
Although the ICC and other ICTs should certainly take into account the 
views and concerns of national communities, they were never intended to 
simulate national judicial mechanisms and should not seek to do so in any 
case.45 The ICTR and ICTY prosecute international law violations in 
Tanzania and the Netherlands respectively—countries far removed from 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.46 While the ICTR and ICTY statutes 
reference domestic sentencing practice, ICTR and ICTY judges have not 
been bound by the penal practices of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.47 
Indeed, the disconnect between these ICTs and the people of Rwanda and 
the former Yugoslavia has been so great that the international community 
created so-called “hybrid” tribunals to address war crimes committed in 
other regions.48 
For the ICC to seek to represent national communities would be 
particularly problematic because it has jurisdiction over cases involving 
“the most serious crimes of international concern,”49 and, under the 
principle of complementarity, the ICC may assert jurisdiction over these 
crimes only if national authorities are either unable or unwilling to 
prosecute them domestically.50 The fact that the ICC need not defer to 
domestic justice when domestic justice is ineffectual reflects the 
 
 
 45. See Sloane, supra note 22, at 52 (“The drafters of the Rome Statute did not design the Court 
with a view to the satisfaction of local penal interests.”).    
 46.  See S.C. Res. 977, U.N. Doc. S/RES/977 (Feb. 22, 1995) (establishing Tanzania as the seat 
of the ICTR); S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the Netherlands 
as the seat of the ICTY). 
 47. Sloane, supra note 22, at 49. The ICC Statute does not reference domestic practices. See id. 
 48. See, e.g., John Cerone, Enhancing the Legitimacy, Status, and Role of the International 
Criminal Court By Using Transitional and Restorative Justice Mechanisms, 6 INTERDISC. J. HUM. 
RTS. L. 83, 91 (2012); Frédéric Mégret, Beyond “Fairness”: Understanding the Detriments of 
International Criminal Procedure, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 37, 47 (2009). Whether 
hybrid tribunals such as the SCSL are better able to act as proxies of national communities is beyond 
the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, although hybrid tribunals are structured so as to better 
accommodate the views of national communities, scholars have expressed skepticism that they are 
truly reflective of the domestic will. See TIMOTHY KELSALL, CULTURE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION: 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 256 (2009) (criticizing the 
SCSL for delivering sentences that do not accord with national sentiments); see also Phuong Pham et 
al., After the First Trial: A Population-Based Survey on Knowledge and Perception of Justice and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 3 (Oct. 1, 2011) (Human Rights Center, 
University of California Berkeley), http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0n22238c (suggesting that 
Cambodians would rather the country focus on economic problems than address crimes committed by 
the Khmer Rouge regime via the country’s hybrid tribunal).  
 49. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 1, 17(1)(a).  
 50. See id. art. 17(1)(a). 
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international community’s longstanding skepticism that every state can be 
trusted to redress serious international crimes.  
A crucial and often overlooked antecedent to the Nuremberg Tribunal 
was Germany’s failure to prosecute those responsible for World War I.51 
Germany tried twelve individuals before the country’s Supreme Court at 
Leipzig, and only six were convicted with sentences ranging from six 
months’ to four years’ imprisonment.52 Based on this experience, the 
Allies were determined to not defer to national justice at Nuremberg.53 The 
ICTR and ICTY followed this precedent by asserting primacy over 
national trials in Rwanda and Yugoslavia.54  
The ICC is designed to work in tandem with domestic criminal courts 
to punish serious international crimes,55 but the complementarity principle 
also incentivizes each state to demonstrate to the international community 
that it can abide by its duty to “exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those 
responsible for serious international crimes.”56 If a state cannot fulfill its 
duties, then the ICC is able to assume jurisdiction. To suggest that the ICC 
should dispense justice according to local sentiments disincentivizes states 
to meet their obligations to the international community.  
Another significant difference between ICTs such as the ICC and 
domestic criminal courts is that the former generally have goals that the 
latter do not.57 As one commentator has observed:  
Beside standard objectives of national criminal law enforcement, 
such as retribution for wrongdoing, general deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation, international criminal courts 
 
 
 51. See Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International 
Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 321, 332–33 (1999).    
 52. Id. at 332. 
 53. Id. at 333. 
 54. ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 8(2); ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 9(2). 
 55. See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 6, pmbl. (noting that the effective prosecution of 
international crimes “must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing 
international cooperation”); Turner, supra note 42, at 2 (suggesting that the ICC should engage with 
national prosecutors and judges to ensure the enforcement of international norms in post-conflict 
societies).   
 56. ICC Statute, supra note 6, pmbl.; see also ICC, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the 
Office of the Prosecutor, ICC Doc. ICC-OTP 2003 (Sept. 2003), at 5, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf (“[T]he principle underlying the concept of 
complementarity is that States remain responsible and accountable for investigating and prosecuting 
crimes committed under their jurisdiction and that national systems are expected to maintain and 
enforce adherence to international standards.”).  
 57. See, e.g., Sloane, supra note 22, at 55; Turner, supra note 42, at 66; see also Milan Markovic, 
The ICC Prosecutor’s Missing Code of Conduct, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 201, 210 (2011) (suggesting that 
ICC trials can and should have educative effects).   
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profess to pursue numerous additional aims . . . . At various times, 
the courts have expressed their intention to produce a reliable 
historical record of the context of international crime, to provide a 
venue for giving voice to international crime’s many victims, and to 
propagate human rights values. Courts have also expressed their 
aspiration to make advances in international criminal law, and to 
achieve objectives related to peace and security—such as stopping 
an ongoing conflict—that are far removed from the normal concerns 
of national criminal justice.58 
Domestic criminal trials may occasionally implicate these goals. Some 
domestic trials can have a bearing on domestic (and even international) 
peace and security, and such trials may also create important records of 
significant historical events.59 However, because international criminal 
trials involve “the most serious crimes of international concern,”60 their 
importance and meaning will almost always transcend whether one 
particular individual should be punished for certain acts that he or she 
allegedly committed.61 Although the ICC and future ICTs might benefit 
from less ambitious agendas,62 this ambition arguably reflects that more is 
expected of international criminal trials.  
Judges at the ICC and future ICTs will obviously play a central role in 
ensuring that their institutions represent international norms and values 
and achieve the distinct goals of international criminal law. Nevertheless, 
there has been little analysis as to whether these judges’ national 
allegiances might interfere with their ability to as act impartial 
representatives of the international community and its values.63 The next 
 
 
 58. Mirjan Damaska, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
329, 331 (2008). 
 59. Scholars have generally been skeptical that international criminal trials can create such a 
record. See, e.g., id. at 338; Woods, supra note 32, at 657 (“The use of retributive criminal trials to 
establish a historical record for grave crimes has been widely criticized.”); see also Allison Marston 
Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command 
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 95 (2005) 
(claiming that courts cannot create a historical narrative and still address the individuation of guilt).  
But see Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in International Criminal 
Trials, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 529, 540 (2008) (noting that constructing a historical narrative has been 
central to the mission of ICTs since Nuremberg).  
 60. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1). 
 61. See Turner, supra note 42, at 536. 
 62. See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 15–16 (2007); 
Damaska, supra note 58, at 331 (“Unlike Atlas, international criminal courts are not bodies of titanic 
strength, capable of carrying on their shoulders the burden of so many tasks.”).  
 63. See generally Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 42–44 (distinguishing view that ICTs 
should dispense impartial justice from the view that judges should only be granted considerable 
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Part contends that judges at the ICC and future ICTs should be 
disqualified from adjudicating cases substantially involving crimes 
allegedly committed by or against their fellow nationals but need not be 
excluded from other cases.   
II. NATIONAL BIAS AND ICT JUDGES 
The international community consists of nations that are politically, 
culturally, and legally diverse. There is a growing sense that the ICC and 
other ICTs should reflect this diversity.64 For example, the state parties to 
the ICC are required to take into account the following in electing judges: 
 (i) The representation of the principal legal systems of the 
world; 
 (ii) Equitable geographical representation; and 
 (iii) A fair representation of female and male judges.65 
The ICC’s effort to establish a diverse judiciary ensures not only that the 
court will better reflect the international community than its 
predecessors,66 but may also help to legitimize the ICC’s actions.67  
A necessary corollary to the question of who should serve on the ICC 
and other ICTs is the question of whether there are any circumstances in 
which the service of certain judges would be incompatible with the 
mandate to speak to the “shared values of humanity and shared interests of 
states.”68 The ICC Statute provides a partial answer by stipulating that 
judges who are nationals of the same state cannot simultaneously serve on 
the court.69 However, while the ICC Statute appears to recognize the value 
of national diversity, it fails to appreciate that judges might be influenced 
by national allegiances in the performance of their duties.  
Although any number of personal characteristics could theoretically 
have a bearing on a judge’s decision-making, national identity is a 
 
 
agency on those issues that are of little concern to the great powers).   
 64. See, e.g., Jessica Almqvist, The Impact of Cultural Diversity on International Criminal 
Proceedings, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 745, 746–47 (2006); see also Turner, supra note 42, at 23.  
 65. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 36(8)(a). 
 66. Analysis of data on judicial appointments at the ICTY and ICTR suggests that the ICTY has 
been dominated by Western judges and the ICTR by African judges, with judges from Latin American 
countries underrepresented on both courts. Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 49. Judges from civil 
law countries are also underrepresented. Id. at 21. 
 67. See Turner, supra note 42, at 23; Markovic, supra note 57, at 208.  
 68. Sloane, supra note 22, at 53. 
 69. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 36(7). 
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particularly powerful source of affiliation. The prominent sociologist 
Anthony Smith has claimed that no “serious rival to the nation . . . exists 
for the affections and loyalties of most human beings.”70 Even ardent 
critics of the concept of “a nation” acknowledge its psychological 
importance.71  
The ICC and other ICTs should be particularly concerned about 
national bias in judging because a system predicated on international 
norms and values should be supported by individuals who are guided 
primarily by the “shared values of humanity and shared interests of 
states.”72 If the ICC and future ICTs apportion criminal responsibility for a 
particular conflict pursuant to the perspective of one party to that conflict, 
they risk compromising their role as neutral representatives of the 
international community. The recourse to international criminal justice 
also indicates that national justice mechanisms have proven inadequate 
and legitimizes the exclusion of domestic norms and values as valid bases 
for decision-making.  
The remainder of this Part will substantiate the claim that national bias 
is likely to affect the adjudication of international criminal trials. Unlike 
ICTs, most other international tribunals recognize that national bias exists 
and seek to account for it. Empirical data from the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) and the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) also 
suggests that judges consistently rule in favor of their home nations while 
not being guided by geopolitical concerns more generally. This is 
consistent with this Article’s contention that judges at the ICC and other 
ICTs should be excluded from only those cases involving crimes allegedly 
committed by or against their fellow nationals. The Part then suggests that 
national bias is especially likely to affect judging at the ICC and other 
ICTs on account of the following: (1) the psychological manifestations of 
the conflicts with which international criminal trials are concerned; (2) the 
motivations of judges; and (3) the nature of fact-finding and legal analysis 
with respect to international criminal trials.     
 
 
 70. A.D. SMITH, NATIONALISM AND MODERNISM: A CRITICAL SURVEY OF RECENT THEORIES OF 
NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 195 (1998); see also Harold Chapman Brown, Social Psychology and the 
Problem of a Higher Nationalism, 28 INT’L J. ETHICS 19, 19 (1917) (“Many humanitarians seem to 
believe that the boundaries of the nations might be swept away and a federation of all mankind 
substituted without loss. But the psychologist can hardly concur in this opinion.”). 
 71. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 6 (1991) (“[M]embers of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in 
the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”).  
 72. Sloane, supra note 22, at 53. 
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A. Practice and Evidence from Other International Tribunals 
In contrast to ICTs, many other international tribunals recognize that a 
judge’s nationality is likely to have a bearing on his or her decision-
making and employ measures to counteract this phenomenon.73 The ICJ 
Statute provides that when one of the ICJ’s judges shares the nationality of 
one of the parties, the other party is entitled to appoint an ad hoc judge to 
hear the case.74 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea follows 
the same practice.75 The ECHR also permits a state to appoint an ad hoc 
judge if it lacks a judge on the chamber hearing a complaint against it 
while not allowing a judge to sit as a single judge with respect to 
complaints made against his or her state.76 The Inter-American Court for 
Human Rights (“IACHR”) and the African Court on Human and People’s 
Rights (“ACHPR”) mandate that judges recuse themselves from cases 
involving their home states.77  
Other prominent international bodies also account for national bias. To 
“promote impartiality in appearance as well as in substance,” members of 
the Human Rights Committee do not consider either periodic reports filed 
by their own states or complaints filed against their states.78 The 
Committee Against Torture similarly prohibits its members from 
examining complaints initiated against their states.79   
One prominent exception is the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), 
which does not allow nationality-based challenges to the composition of 
any chamber.80 Given its role as a quasi-constitutional court for Europe,81 
it is understandable that the ECJ would seek to dismiss the notion that a 
 
 
 73. See Dannenbaum, supra note 4, at 78.  
 74. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 31(2), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].  
 75. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Annex XI art. 17(2), Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 39. 
 76. See Dannenbaum, supra note 4, at 98 (citing Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, Protocol No. 14 Amending the Control System of the Convention, May 
13, 2004, C.E.T.S. No. 194). Although states are not required to only nominate candidates of their own 
nationality to sit on the ECHR, that is the usual outcome. See id. 
 77. Id. at 92, 97. 
 78. See Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights, The 
Human Rights Committee, Fact Sheet No. 15 (Rev. 1) 13 (May 2005), http://www.ohchr.org/ 
Documents/Publications/FactSheet15rev.1en.pdf. 
 79. Rules of Procedure for the Committee Against Torture, Rule 109(c), U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/3/Rev.5 (Feb. 2011). 
 80. Dannenbaum, supra note 4, at 100.  
 81. Geoffrey Garret et al., The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal 
Integration in the European Union, 52 INT’L ORG. 149, 149 (1998) (“The [ECJ] interprets EU treaties 
as if they represent a de facto constitution for Europe.”).  
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judge’s nationality has any bearing on the adjudicative process. 
Furthermore, to ensure that the decision-making of individual judges is 
shielded from scrutiny, the ECJ “organizes its work with a degree of 
opacity that rivals that of the secret sessions of England’s Fifteenth 
Century Star Chamber.”82 The ECJ issues opinions only by consensus, and 
prohibits dissenting opinions.83 The means by which judges are assigned 
to a particular chamber is also a mystery.84 Such opacity would be 
unacceptable at the ICC, where judges hear cases in the open, issue signed 
opinions, and can be held responsible for their rulings.   
The World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body (“WTO AB”) is 
another exception. The WTO AB does not require recusal when one of its 
members shares the nationality of a party before the tribunal,85 and 
members are assigned to a particular division “regardless of their national 
origin.”86 Interestingly, the panels from which the WTO AB hears appeals 
do require their members to recuse themselves from cases involving their 
home nations.87 This dichotomy may simply reflect the limited jurisdiction 
of the WTO AB88 and that its members are required to be technocrats who 
are unaffiliated with any particular government.89 ICT judges conversely 
have far more adjudicative discretion90 and are selected largely on the 
basis of nationality.91  
All of the international tribunals that do explicitly account for national 
bias, either by requiring the recusal of judges as with the IACHR and 
ACHPR, or the appointment of ad hoc judges as with the ICJ and ECHR, 
address (often controversial) claims of state misconduct. The ICC and 
 
 
 82. R. Daniel Kelemen, The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in the European 
Union (Rutgers University Working Paper, Feb. 23, 2011) at 6, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1914516.  
 83. Id. at 9.  
 84. Id. at 11. 
 85. Dannenbaum, supra note 4, at 103–04. 
 86. Appellate Body, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, art. 6(2), WT/AB/WP/6 (Aug. 
16, 2010), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_e.htm.   
 87. Dannenbaum, supra note 4, at 103. 
 88. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2: Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 17(6), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm (“An appeal shall 
be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the 
panel.”). 
 89. Id. Annex 2, art. 17(3) (“The Appellate Body shall comprise persons of recognized authority, 
with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered 
agreements generally. They shall be unaffiliated with any government.”). 
 90. See Byrne, supra note 17, at 248.  
 91. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, arts. 36(7)–(8); see also Erik Voeten, The Politics of 
International Judicial Appointments, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 387, 402 (2009) (noting that nationality is the 
most significant factor in determining whether a judicial candidate is elected to an ICT). 
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other ICTs consider claims against individuals, however, which might 
suggest that nations’ interests are not as implicated in international 
criminal trials, obviating the need to control for national bias. 
It is true that ICTs such as the ICC do not directly consider claims 
against states.92 The ICC Statute specifically provides that “[n]o provision 
in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the 
responsibility of States under international law.”93 Nevertheless, claims 
can still be brought against states based on individuals’ violations of 
international criminal law. In the Bosnia Genocide case, for example, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina sought to hold Serbia responsible for genocide 
based on the actions of Bosnian forces in Srebrenica and other regions of 
Bosnia.94 The ICJ ultimately dismissed most of the claims against Serbia 
but in so doing relied almost entirely on the ICTY’s findings with respect 
to the Bosnian conflict.95 Consequently, while the ICC does not consider 
claims against states, ICC judgments could form the basis of subsequent 
actions against states in other forums.96 
Moreover, notwithstanding that a crime may be of concern to the 
“international community as a whole,”97 it will almost always be of 
greatest concern to one or more states. The ICC’s first defendant, rebel 
leader Thomas Lubanga, has been described as a “small fish,”98 but the 
ICC found that Mr. Lubanga committed serious crimes in connection with 
the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”).99 An 
acquittal would have been damaging to the DRC government and may 
 
 
 92. It is possible, however, that a state might be entitled to the “specific proceeds, property or 
assets which have been derived directly or indirectly from the crime.” See ICC, International Criminal 
Court Rules of Evidence and Procedure, Rule 147, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter ICC 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F1E0AC1C-
A3F3-4A3C-B9A7-B3E8B115E886/140164/Rules_ of_procedure_and_Evidence_English.pdf. 
 93. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 25(4).   
 94. See Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. 
& Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 91, ¶ 64 (Feb. 26). 
 95. See id. ¶ 214.  
 96. This would include not only international tribunals such as the ICJ and ECHR but domestic 
courts as well. 
 97. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1). 
 98. See, e.g., David Smith, Congo Warlord Thomas Lubanga Convicted of Using Child Soldiers, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2012),  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/14/congo-thomas-lubanga-
child-soldiers; see also Andrew Harding, Meeting Lubanga, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17368072 (noting perception of Lubanga as a “small fish”). 
 99. Lubanga was convicted of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen and 
using them to participate actively in hostilities in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo from early September 2002 to August 13, 2003. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of Statute, ¶ 1 (July 12, 2012). 
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have fomented instability in the country.100 Virtually every case before the 
ICC will involve a defendant who is alleged to have committed violations 
of international law against, or on behalf of, one or more states. These 
states will have a vested interest in the conviction or acquittal of that 
defendant.  
Data from the ICJ and ECHR suggests that international tribunals’ 
concerns about national bias in judging are well-founded. In a 2005 article, 
Posner and de Figueiredo examined the voting of ICJ judges who 
participated in the seventy-six cases that reached a substantive decision.101 
The authors hypothesized that, inter alia, judges would tend to vote in 
favor of their home states as well as countries that resembled their own in 
terms of region, wealth, and political structure.102  
Posner and de Figueiredo found clear evidence that ICJ judges exhibit 
bias in favor of their home states. Ad hoc judges voted 90.5% in favor of 
their home states when the home state was an applicant and 90.2% of the 
time when the home state was a respondent.103 While these results could 
be explained by the fact that ad hoc judges might conceive of themselves 
as advocates for their nations, the ICJ’s permanent judges voted similarly. 
Permanent judges voted in favor of their home states 83.3% of the time 
when the home state was an applicant and 89.5% of the time when the 
home state was the respondent.104 In all, ICJ judges ruled in favor of their 
home states nearly 90% of the time.105 Posner and de Figueiredo also 
found some evidence for their hypothesis that ICJ judges vote for states 
that resemble their own in terms of wealth and political structure,106 but 
did not find that judges were influenced by regional and military 
alignments.107  
Similarly, Erik Voeten analyzed the dissents of ECHR judges in 1,024 
Level 1 judgments to determine the bearing of a judge’s nationality and 
 
 
 100. When the Lubanga Trial was previously suspended, observers warned of instability in the 
Ituri region where Lubanga remains quite popular. See DRC: ICC Suspension a Risk for Ituri Stability, 
IRIN AFRICA (June 24, 2008), http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=78820 (quoting a 
human rights lawyer in Kinshasa). 
 101. Posner & de Figueiredo, supra note 19, at 604–05.   
 102. See id. at 609. 
 103. Id. at 615. A similar study by Adam M. Smith found that judges voted with their states 80% 
of the time. See Adam M. Smith, Judicial Nationalism in International Law: National Identity and 
Judicial Autonomy at the ICJ, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 197, 218 (2005). 
 104. Posner & de Figueiredo, supra note 19, at 615; see also Smith, supra note 103, at 218 
(finding that permanent judges voted with their home states 70% of the time). 
 105. Posner & de Figueiredo, supra note 19, at 615. 
 106. See id. at 617.  
 107. See, e.g., id. at 622. 
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other factors on the ECHR’s decision-making.108 He found that when a 
ruling favored the respondent state, 100% of ad hoc judges and 95% of 
permanent judges from the respondent country voted with the majority.109 
When a ruling went against the respondent state, 33% of ad hoc judges 
and 16% of permanent judges from the respondent state dissented 
compared to only 8% of the other judges.110 These findings were 
statistically significant and led Voeten to conclude that ECHR judges fail 
to be impartial when evaluating the conduct of their own national 
governments.111   
Voeten also found that national bias is particularly prevalent in cases 
involving article 3 of the European Convention, which prohibits torture 
and inhumane treatment.112 In such cases, judges were 25% more likely to 
vote in favor of their national governments than in other cases.113 Voeten 
attributes this phenomenon to the political sensitivity of these cases and 
their potential bearing on national security.114 There was no evidence, 
however, that other factors such as legal culture or geopolitics impacted 
the decision-making of ECHR judges.115 
Lastly, in a 2005 study, Meernik, King, and Dancy analyzed the 
sentencing practices of the ICTY Trial Chamber.116 Although ICTY 
defendants do not share the nationalities of the ICTY’s judges, the study is 
nevertheless useful for its examination of whether national bias might lead 
judges to take into account their nations’ foreign policy interests. The 
authors hypothesized that judges from certain NATO countries sentenced 
Serbian defendants more harshly than did other judges.117 They found no 
significant differences in sentencing, however, and concluded more 
generally that “the characteristics of the nation and political system from 
which ICTY judges come do not predict the severity of the punishment in 
the manner expected.”118  
 
 
 108. Voeten, supra note 19, at 425. Level 1 judgments are those that the ECHR itself deems as 
most legally significant. Id.   
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 425–26. 
 112. Id. at 427–28. 
 113. Id. at 428. 
 114. Id. at 430. 
 115. Id. at 431. 
 116. James Meernik et al., Judicial Decision Making and International Tribunals: Assessing the 
Impact of Individual, National, and International Factors, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. 683, 695 (2005).   
 117. Id. at 690. Unfortunately, Meernik et al. focus only on the decision-making of judges from 
the United States, France, and Great Britain, and do not consider the decision-making of judges from 
other NATO countries such as Germany. Id. 
 118. Id. at 698. 
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Taken together, the results from the ICJ and ECHR clearly suggest that 
national bias impacts decision-making when a judge is asked to adjudicate 
the conduct (or misconduct) of his or her nation. Data from the ICJ, 
ECHR, and ICTY does not indicate, however, that national bias leads 
judges to vote according to their nations’ geopolitical interests. These 
findings are consistent with this Article’s proposal that judges should be 
disqualified from cases involving crimes allegedly committed by or 
against their nationals but not necessarily other cases. 
Of course, none of the above studies specifically addresses whether an 
ICT judge is likely to rule on the basis of domestic norms and interests in a 
case involving crimes allegedly committed by or against his or her 
nationals. Moreover, there are obvious limitations to the utility of findings 
from other tribunals. The next section sets out the reasons why national 
bias is particularly likely to affect judges at the ICC and other ICTs.  
B. National Bias in the Adjudication of International Criminal Trials 
Although data from international tribunals such as the ICJ and ECHR 
suggests that a judge’s nationality impacts his or her decision-making in 
cases pertaining to his or her home nation, national bias may not 
necessarily have a discernible impact on international criminal trials. The 
ICJ considers claims by states against other states and has been described 
as a product of “a Westphalian world in which states were the only 
legitimate transnational actors, and nationality, in turn, was a prime aspect 
of individual definition.”119 The ECHR and ICTs both address human 
rights violations committed against individuals, but the interests of states 
could be more directly implicated in ECHR proceedings, given that states 
are the respondents, than they are in international criminal trials.120   
This Part will explain why ICT judges are especially likely to exhibit 
national bias. International criminal trials will usually address “intractable 
conflicts” that are characterized as “protracted, irreconcilable, violent, of a 
zero-sum nature, total, and central, with the parties involved having an 
interest in their continuation . . . [as well as being] costly both in human 
and material terms.”121 Judges cannot be expected to psychologically 
separate themselves from their national polities when assigning 
responsibility for crimes committed in intractable conflicts involving their 
 
 
 119. Smith, supra note 103, at 222.  
 120. But see discussion supra Part II.A.  
 121. Daniel Bar-Tal, From Intractable Conflict Through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: 
Psychological Analysis, 21 POL. PSYCH. 351, 353 (2000).  
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home nations. States are also able to nominate judges to the ICC and other 
ICTs who share their perspectives, and these judges will have strong 
incentives to rule in accordance with their states’ interests. This creates the 
potential for actual bias as well as the reasonable apprehension of bias on 
the part of a conflict’s participants. Lastly, ICT judges also possess a great 
deal of adjudicative discretion and are able to consciously or 
unconsciously give effect to their national biases. 
1. Psychological Manifestations of Intractable Conflicts 
International criminal trials involve horrific crimes committed against 
the citizens of one or more nations. The ICC Statute describes such crimes 
as “unimaginable” and “shocking [to the] conscience of humanity.”122 
Judges at the ICC and other ICTs will inevitably be outraged by many of 
the acts that defendants appearing before them are alleged to have 
committed.123 The source of this outrage will differ, however, depending 
on whether the crimes in question were committed against the judge’s 
home nation. When a case does not involve a judge’s home nation, the 
judge will react as a member of the international community to the 
defendant’s alleged assault upon global stability and global humanity.124 
When a case does involve the judge’s home nation, the judge will 
primarily react as a member of his or her national community to the 
defendant’s alleged assault upon that particular community. A judge will 
also be inclined to react more as a member of his or her national 
community when the judge shares the nationality of the defendant, and the 
defendant allegedly committed war crimes in the context of defending 
their shared state from a significant internal or external threat.   
A terrible crime, particularly if it is political in nature, might inspire 
feelings of nationalist outrage among judges in domestic courts as well. 
However, a domestic proceeding with full procedural safeguards is not 
made illegitimate if the judge views the crimes from the perspective of his 
or her fellow nationals. Indeed, domestic judges are representatives of 
their national communities and are expected to embody their communities’ 
“shared valuations.”125 In most cases, a judge’s view of the events at issue 
 
 
 122. ICC Statute, supra note 6, pmbl. 
 123. See Woods, supra note 32, at 662–63. 
 124. Sloane, supra note 22, at 54 (citing MICHAEL WALZER, The Politics of Rescue, in ARGUING 
AGAINST WAR 74 (2004)). 
 125. See J.C. Oleson, The Antigone Dilemma: When the Paths of Law and Morality Diverge, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 669, 692–93 (2007) (“Adjudication is particularly laden with moral significance in 
criminal cases. Each time a judge sentences an offender to prison, or condemns an individual to death, 
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will not be out of step with his or her fellow citizens.126  
Conversely, to represent “the international community as a whole” in a 
tribunal such as the ICC,127 judges must be able to separate themselves 
from their national polities and look beyond merely domestic interests and 
norms. To the extent that international criminal trials involve intractable 
conflicts, however, such separation will be exceedingly difficult: 
During [an] intractable conflict, the socio-psychological 
infrastructure helps the society members to satisfy their basic needs 
to cope with stress and to successfully withstand the enemy. But at 
the same time, this infrastructure becomes a prism through which 
society members construe their reality, collect new information, 
interpret their experiences, and then make decisions. . . . 
[I]nvolvement in intractable conflicts tends to “close minds” and 
stimulate tunnel vision, which excludes incongruent information 
and alternative approaches to the conflict.128  
The ICC, in light of its mandate to consider the “most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole”129 can be expected to 
predominately have jurisdiction over intractable conflicts, as opposed to 
low-intensity conflicts of relatively short duration.130  
Psychological studies involving intractable conflicts reveal the degree 
to which intractable conflicts cause dramatic distortions in the 
 
 
it should be a solemn, transformative ritual. The judge, representing the public, banishes the 
transgressor from civic society.”); see also Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning and 
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 351 (1997) (claiming that the criminal law’s purpose is to reflect 
“shared valuations”). 
 126. This argument would have less force for societies that are deeply divided and where the 
judiciary is composed of only a small cross-section of society because judges would have less of a 
claim to speak for the society as a whole. Cf. Daniel Levin, Federalists in the Attic: Original Intent, 
the Heritage Movement, and Democratic Theory, 29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 105, 107 (2004) (“Without a 
clear consensus [on values], judges must impose a particular set of values that may not reflect the 
larger public will and may be more representative of certain cultural or legal elites.”). 
 127. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1). 
 128. Daniel Bar-Tal, Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts, 50 AM. BEHAV. 
SCIENTIST 1430, 1446–47 (2007). 
 129. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1). 
 130. The ICC’s Kenya prosecutions are possible exceptions. See In re The Situation of the 
Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ¶¶ 8–10 (Mar. 31, 2010) 
(Kaul, J., dissenting) (suggesting that crimes committed within the Republic of Kenya were “common 
crimes,” outside of the jurisdiction of the ICC). Even in such cases, however, the influence of their 
appointing nation may shape the judges’ ability to view the case. See infra Part II.B.2; cf. Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal. Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009) (“[T]here is a serious risk of actual bias—based on 
objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a 
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case.”).  
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participants’ ability to process information related to these conflicts.131 For 
example, in one prominent study, psychologists provided Israeli Jews and 
Israeli Arabs with copies of Israeli and Palestinian interim peace proposals 
that had originally been distributed during bilateral Israeli-Palestinian 
peace talks in Washington, D.C. in May 1993.132 The study’s participants 
were asked to rate how favorable the proposals were to Israelis and 
Palestinians, with only half of the participants receiving correct 
information as to which side had authored the proposal.133    
Not surprisingly, putative authorship significantly affected both 
groups’ perceptions of the proposals.134 Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs 
believed that the Palestinian proposal was more favorable to Israelis and 
less favorable to Palestinians when they believed that it was an Israeli 
proposal than when the proposal was correctly identified as a Palestinian 
one.135 More striking is that the actual contents of the proposal had less of 
an effect on the participants’ perceptions of the proposal than putative 
authorship.136 Israeli Jews generally responded more negatively to an 
Israeli proposal when they believed it to be a Palestinian proposal than 
they did to the actual Palestinian proposal when it was attributed to 
Israel.137 
In another study, also involving Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs, 
experimenters provided test subjects with three short vignettes involving a 
shooting.138 The vignettes either involved Israeli Jews travelling by car 
through an Arab-dominated town or Israeli Arabs travelling by car through 
a Jewish-dominated town.139  The subjects were told that the passengers 
faced the following threats before they fired guns from the car: (1) a 
demonstration of shouting women and children who did not threaten 
physical harm to the passengers; (2) a demonstration with stones thrown at 
the vehicle; and (3) a demonstration in which firearms were used against 
 
 
 131. See, e.g., Daniel Bar-Tal et al., The Influence of the Ethos of Conflict on Israeli Jews’ 
Interpretation of Jewish-Palestinian Encounters, 53 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 94 (2009); Ifat Maoz et al., 
Reactive Devaluation of an “Israeli” v. “Palestinian” Peace Proposal, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 515 
(2002).   
 132. Maoz el al., supra note 131, at 528. 
 133. Id. at 529. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 532. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Yohanan Eshel & Michael Moran, Jewish-Arab Violence: Perspectives of a Dominant 
Majority and a Subordinate Minority, 142 J. SOC. PSYCH. 549 (2002). 
 139. Id. at 553. 
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the vehicle.140 Subjects were then asked to rate the justifiability of the 
shootings and explain why the shootings were (or were not) justified.141  
According to the study’s findings, both Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs 
justified shootings by members of their own groups more readily than 
shootings committed by members of the other group, notwithstanding that 
all of the shooters faced the same basic threats.142 Jewish and Arab 
participants also tended to offer different justifications for the shootings. 
Jewish participants predominately focused on the danger to the shooters 
and more often cited self-defense as a justification whereas Arab 
participants concentrated primarily on the motives of the shooters and 
demonstrators as well as the history of Jewish-Arab conflict.143 The 
authors concluded that “in-group bias in judging intergroup violence 
should be expected when it is associated with issues of self- and national 
identity or with the image of the opposite group.”144  
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an especially intractable conflict, and 
it would be far too crude to assume that judges at the ICC and other ICTs 
will discredit information provided by “enemy” witnesses and overvalue 
information provided by their compatriots. Nor will judges necessarily 
reject defenses offered by “enemy” defendants that they would accept 
from other defendants. However, judges are presumably not immune to 
the same psychological pressures that affect their fellow nationals in an 
intractable conflict. They cannot just focus on the evidence before them as 
disinterested members of the international community because evidence 
will be analyzed through the prism of membership in a national polity 
locked in an intractable conflict.  
It may be objected that judges, unlike laypeople, are required to be 
impartial. It is dubious, however, that judges’ conscious efforts to maintain 
impartiality while serving on the ICC or another ICT can negate what are 
largely unconscious processes. Indeed, according to some studies, 
 
 
 140. Id. at 554–55. 
 141. Id. at 555. 
 142. Id. at 561. 
 143. Id. at 562. 
 144. Id. at 561–62 (internal citations omitted). 
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exhortations and directives to individuals to “be objective” actually 
exacerbate cognitive biases.145 As Dan Kahan has observed: 
 [O]bjectivity injunctions accentuate identity threat. Individuals 
naturally assume that beliefs they share with others in their defining 
group are “objective.” Accordingly, those are the beliefs they are 
most likely to see as correct when prompted to be “rational” and 
“open-minded.”  Indeed, for them to change their minds in such a 
circumstance would require them to discern irrationality or bias 
within their group, an inference fraught with dissonance . . . .146  
Even if judges are assumed to be less susceptible to cognitive dissonance 
than their fellow nationals, an international trial involving horrific crimes 
allegedly committed by or against members of a judge’s national polity is 
an unlikely venue for professional detachment to triumph over the natural 
tendency to view a conflict and the crimes committed therein through the 
prism of national identity.  
Of course, the idea that judges will be unconsciously motivated by 
national bias presupposes that a judge will identify with his or her national 
community and does not adequately account for the rich national 
backgrounds of many prominent international judges.147 Nevertheless, the 
mere fact that a judge may be a citizen of more than one state is unlikely to 
insulate the judge from the psychological phenomena addressed in this 
section.148 Immigrants can presumably integrate into their new societies 
and may be able to form as strong national allegiances as their native-born 
compatriots.149 Even if a judge may have been a part of a different national 
polity at one time, he or she may still assess an intractable conflict 
involving his or her current home nation through the prism of domestic 
 
 
 145. See Dan Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for 
Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 23 (2011) (citing Geoffrey L. Cohen et al., Bridging the 
Partisan Divide: Self-Affirmation Reduces Ideological Closed-Mindedness and Inflexibility in 
Negotiation, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 415 (2007)).  
 146. Id. 
 147. The former President of the ICTY, Theodor Meron, for example, was born in Poland, 
immigrated to Israel, where he served in the country’s foreign service, and moved to the United States 
in 1978. See Biographical Note: President Theodor Meron, ICTY (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.icty.org/ 
x/file/About/Chambers/pdt_meron_bio_news_1mar2012_en.pdf. He became a U.S. citizen in 1984. Id. 
See also Smith, supra note 103, at 223 (reviewing backgrounds of ICJ judges).  
 148. The ICC Statute suggests that citizenship should be determined by where a judge primarily 
exercises his or her civil rights. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 36(7).  
 149. A full account of the mechanics of national integration is beyond the scope of this article.  
For an early analysis of the integration of immigrants and minority groups in United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Australia, see ANTHONY H. BIRCH, NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION 3 
(1989).  
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norms and values. Furthermore, as set out in the following Part, the nature 
of the nomination process at ICTs, like the ICC, by and large assures that 
judges will be attuned to the national self-interest.  
2. Judges and Motivated Reasoning 
Judges at the ICTY and ICTR serve four-year terms and are then 
eligible for reelection.150 ICC judges, by way of contrast, generally serve 
nine-year terms and are ineligible for reelection.151 However, regardless of 
whether a judge must stand for reelection, it will be in his or her self-
interest to avoid alienating his or her home state.  This Part will focus on 
the likely motivations of ICC judges, but the argument will apply equally 
to other ICTs, as long as states control the nomination process and largely 
determine judges’ careers.     
The ICC Statute allows for a judge to be removed upon a 
recommendation by a two-thirds majority of the ICC’s judges and then a 
two-thirds majority vote by the Assembly of State Parties.152 
Consequently, absent egregious misconduct, ICC judges are likely to serve 
the entirety of their terms.153 This provides a degree of protection from 
political pressure and allows them to make unpopular decisions.   
Although ICC judges are not eligible for reelection and cannot easily 
be removed, they are still very likely to be concerned with how their 
judgments are perceived. Judges, whether they serve on domestic or 
international courts, are motivated to maintain and improve their 
standing.154 ICC judges will undoubtedly wish to be well-regarded by the 
international community, but of equal or greater concern will be how they 
are regarded by their own states.  Most judges will wish to at least have 
the opportunity to return to employment in their own countries after the 
 
 
 150. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 13(3); ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 12(3).  
 151. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 36(9)(a). A judge can theoretically serve a longer term, 
however, if he or she is elected to complete another judge’s term and less than three years is remaining 
on that term. See id. art. 37(2). 
 152. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 46(2)(a). 
 153. See id. art. 46(1) (setting out grounds for removal of ICC judges). 
 154. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 3, at 929 (suggesting that, in the context of international 
criminal law, “the judge, practitioner, or scholar who espouses conviction-friendly interpretations can 
reliably expect to be applauded as progressive and compassionate by esteem-granting communities”); 
Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 
CINCINNATI L. REV. 615, 629–30 (2000) (suggesting that justices of the United States Supreme Court 
are motivated to rule in ways that are in substantive accordance with legal elites); Richard Posner, 
What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, 3 SUP. CT. L. ECON. REV. 1, 15 (1993) (suggesting that for 
the extraordinary judge, such as the justices of the Supreme Court, reputation may be a “dominating 
objective”). 
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conclusion of their nine-year terms. Some may also wish to secure 
appointments with other international tribunals, and “international judicial 
careers depend heavily on government recommendations.”155 To the extent 
that an ICC judge is concerned with his or her post-ICC career, the judge 
will have to carefully strike a balance between fulfilling his or her duties 
and not alienating his or her home government.   
Of course, the outcomes of most ICC cases will be of relatively little 
interest to a judge’s home state.156 Moreover, even if a judge were to issue 
a decision that is arguably at odds with the foreign policy of his or her 
home state, the state may not take any action against the judge. ICC judges 
are required to be independent and impartial,157 and respect for judicial 
impartiality and independence requires that states support judges’ 
decisions even when they might disagree with them.158 By allowing ICC 
judges to carry out their duties free from political interference, states also 
signal to the international community that they are credibly committed to 
international justice and are uninterested in victor’s justice.159       
However, the focus of this Article is not on cases that only tangentially 
concern a judge’s home state, but rather those involving crimes allegedly 
committed by or against a judge’s fellow nationals and other cases that 
strongly implicate the national self-interest. Such cases are bound to attract 
attention in the judge’s home state and are likely to impact political 
conditions therein. A judge will be able to readily surmise whether it is in 
his or her self-interest to convict the defendants without interference from 
his or her state.  
Judges need not even consciously consider their personal interests for 
these interests to affect their decision-making on account of the 
psychological phenomenon of motivated reasoning:   
Motivated reasoning refers to the tendency of people to 
unconsciously process information—including empirical data, oral 
and written arguments, and even their own brute sensory 
 
 
 155. Erik Voeten, International Judicial Independence, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 421, 442 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. 
Pollack eds., 2013). 
 156. See Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 44 (“Judges may have considerable agency on those 
issues that are of little concern to the great powers.”). 
 157. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 40(1). 
 158. See Robert H. Jackson, The Rule of Law Among Nations, 31 A.B.A. J. 290, 294 (1945) (“It is 
futile to think that we can have international courts that will always render the decisions we want to 
promote our interests. We cannot successfully cooperate with the rest of the world in establishing a 
reign of law unless we are prepared to have that law sometimes operate against what would be our 
national advantage.”).  
 159. See Voeten, supra note 91, at 392; Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 42.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
28 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:1 
 
 
 
 
perceptions—to promote goals or interests extrinsic to the decision-
making task at hand. When subject to it, individuals can be 
unwittingly disabled from making dispassionate, open-minded, and 
fair judgments.160 
There is a growing literature assessing the impact of motivated reasoning 
on judging in a variety of legal fields.161 The implication for the ICC is 
that judges may honestly wish to rule impartially in cases substantially 
involving their home states, but they will be motivated to take into account 
domestic political concerns and interests so as to not jeopardize their 
careers.162 A judge does not even have to feel strong ties to his or her 
national polity to be highly motivated to analyze a case involving his or 
her home nation in accordance with the national self-interest.   
Not all ICC judges will have the same motivations. Some judges will 
be less concerned with their long-term professional well being than others. 
For example, Voeten’s research concerning the ECHR found that older 
judges were more likely to rule against their home nations.163 ECHR 
judges whose careers were primarily in private practice, which presumably 
made them less dependent on their national governments for employment, 
were also more likely to rule against their home nations.164 
States could theoretically nominate judges to the ICC who come from 
backgrounds that will allow them to exercise a great deal of independence. 
Recent research concerning the ICTY and ICTR reveals, however, that the 
typical elected judge is in his or her mid-fifties and has usually served as 
an appellate judge in his or her home state immediately prior to being 
elected.165 This archetype would not seem to lend itself to a great degree of 
independence. Moreover, states can choose to nominate only judges who 
are highly sensitive to their domestic interests. Voeten notes that one 
 
 
 160. Kahan, supra note 145, at 7.  
 161. See Michael Serota, Popular Constitutional Interpretation, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1637, 1671 
(2012) (collecting scholarship on motivated reasoning and its effect on constitutional law); Donald 
Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated to Create Good Securities Doctrine?, EMORY L.J. 309, 317 (2002) 
(suggesting that motivated reasoning on the part of judges explains securities fraud doctrine). Stuart 
Ford has recently suggested that motivated reasoning affects perceptions of the legitimacy of ICTs. See 
Stuart Ford, A Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts: 
Implications for the Success of Transitional Justice Mechanisms, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 405, 
409 (2012). 
 162. See Kahan, supra note 145, at 20 (noting that conscious ends can be subverted by pecuniary 
and social interests). 
 163. See Voeten, supra note 19, at 427. Judges who were nearing the ECHR’s retirement age of 
seventy were 12% more likely to vote against their national governments than other judges. Id. 
 164. See id. at 430. 
 165. See Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 54–55.  
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particularly effective strategy would be to nominate diplomats, who are far 
more inclined to rule in favor of their home states than judges from other 
backgrounds.166 States that wish to reasonably assure themselves that their 
nominees will rule in accordance with the national self-interest could 
adopt such a strategy and may be able to work with other states to ensure 
that their nominees are elected to the ICC and other ICTs.   
Even if ICT judges are not actually biased in favor of their nations, the 
fact that their nations play the central role in their election and have the 
ability to impact their careers at the conclusion of their terms allows for 
their impartiality to reasonably be questioned.167 As the United States 
Supreme Court has emphasized, when a party with a personal stake in a 
proceeding before a judge has had a significant and disproportionate 
influence in securing his or election, the judge is reasonably perceived to 
be biased in that party’s favor.168 In the context of international criminal 
trials, it is virtually impossible for judges to be elected absent strong 
support from their states, and they will reasonably be perceived as biased 
in their states’ favor in cases where their states’ interests are strongly 
implicated.    
Indeed, courts have found that relatively minor financial interests in a 
proceeding’s outcome can create the reasonable apprehension of bias.169 
Lord Hewart originated the dictum that “[j]ustice must not only be done, 
but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done” to justify the 
disqualification of judges not on the basis of their own financial interests 
but those of their deputy clerk.170 It is unclear why ICT judges’ far more 
substantial financial interests in securing employment at the conclusion of 
 
 
 166. See Voeten, supra note 19, at 430. Four of the eighteen judges initially appointed to the ICC 
had spent most of their careers as diplomats. Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 59.  
 167. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 41(2).  
 168. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, 556 U.S. 868, 882–86 (2009). 
 169. See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (overturning defendant’s conviction for 
unlawful possession of liquor where the judge, the town’s mayor, stood to earn twelve dollars from the 
conviction); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973) (overturning administrative board 
proceeding where a board of optometrists had presided over trial of possible competitors); Dimes v. 
Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal, [1852] 10 Eng. Rep. 301 (H.L.) 315 (“No one can suppose that 
Lord Cottenham could be, in the remotest degree, influenced by the interest that he had in this concern; 
but, my Lords, it is of the last importance that the maxim that no man is to be a judge in his own cause 
should be held sacred.”); see also R. v. Bow Street Magistrates, [2000] 1 A.C. 119 (H.L.) 132 (“[If] a 
judge is in fact a party to the litigation or has a financial or proprietary interest in its outcome . . . the 
mere fact that he is a party to the action or has a financial or proprietary interest in its outcome is 
sufficient to cause his automatic disqualification.”). 
 170. R. v. Sussex Justice, Ex Parte McCarthy, [1923] 1 K.B. 256 at 259. 
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their terms should not give rise to reasonable doubt about their 
impartiality.171  
Although ICC judges may strive to be independent and impartial, they 
are likely to evaluate conflicts involving their own nations through the 
prism of national identity and have strong incentives to rule in accordance 
with the national will. States can also nominate judges who are highly 
attuned to domestic interests. These factors will naturally lead to doubts as 
to their impartiality even in the absence of actual bias. As set out in the 
next section, the nature of adjudication at ICTs is such that judges will 
rarely be constrained from giving effect to any existing national biases. 
3. The Nature of Adjudication at ICTs   
International judges, unlike their domestic counterparts, do not have a 
common history and legal tradition to draw upon in fulfilling their duties. 
Although the last twenty years have resulted in the establishment of a 
community of international criminal lawyers and judges, this community’s 
norms and interpretive practices are only beginning to develop,172 and the 
ICC system is sui generis. Consequently, judges at the ICC and other ICTs 
have more adjudicative discretion than their domestic counterparts.173  
Some scholars have suggested that international judges will not be 
influenced by domestic interests and concerns because of monitoring from 
the international community.174 This presupposes, however, that judges’ 
breaches of the duties of independence and impartiality are relatively 
 
 
 171. It is not only the participants to a conflict who might seize upon the nationality of a judge to 
seek to undermine the integrity and impartiality of the proceedings. Judge Harhoff, a Danish judge 
serving on the ICTY, has alleged that President Meron exerted pressure on colleagues to restrict the 
ICTY’s jurisprudence on aiding and abetting liability so as to make it less likely that American and 
Israeli military leaders could be charged with war crimes. See David Rhode, How International Justice 
is Being Gutted, ATLANTIC (July 14, 2013),  http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/ 
07/how-international-justice-is-being-gutted/277767/. As of the date of this Article, Judge Harhoff has 
offered no evidence to support his allegations other than innuendo regarding President Meron’s 
American and Israeli citizenship. See also supra note 147 (noting personal background of President 
Meron). 
 172. See Byrne, supra note 17, at 248; see also Nancy A. Combs, Legitimizing International 
Criminal Justice: The Importance of Process Control, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 321, 325 (2012) 
(suggesting that international criminal law had fallen into desuetude after the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals only to be revived and reinvigorated by the establishment of the ICTY and other ICTs).  
 173. See, e.g., Damaska, supra note 58, at 335; Julian Cook, Plea Bargaining at the Hague, 30 
YALE J. INT’L L. 473, 477 (claiming that ICTY rules afford judges “illimitable discretion”). 
 174. See Dannenbaum, supra note 4, at 134; see also Cesare P. R. Romano, The United States and 
International Courts: Getting the Cost-Benefit Analysis Right, in THE SWORD AND THE SCALES: THE 
UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 419, 441–42 (Cesare P.R. Romano 
ed., 2009) (“If [international judges] . . . start applying law in a way that might be perceived as biased, 
or a cave-in to states’ pressure, they undermine their own rationale.”). 
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simple to detect. International criminal trials are long and fact-intensive, 
and judgments are notoriously verbose and dense, making effective 
monitoring difficult.175 When ICT judgments are criticized, it is usually 
because a particular verdict does not match the international community’s 
(or a particular national community’s) sense of a defendant’s guilt.176 ICT 
judges are especially unlikely to be criticized when their judgments are 
slanted towards liability.177  
More importantly, the nature of adjudication at the ICC and other ICTs 
is such that judges can often reasonably interpret the facts and law 
undergirding cases to consciously or unconsciously fit a preferred 
outcome. Although domestic adjudication has political dimensions as 
well,178 this is an acute problem for the ICC and other ICTs because the 
facts and law will rarely compel one conclusion, allowing domestic 
politics and judges’ personal interests to more regularly enter into the 
decision-making process.  
a. Fact-Finding by ICTs 
One significant challenge for ICTs such as the ICC is that fact-finding 
is far more difficult than for domestic courts. Investigations occur during, 
or in the immediate aftermath of, armed conflicts, and investigators are 
often unable to access war crimes sites.179 Consequently, forensic and 
 
 
 175. For example, the ICC’s first judgment in the Lubanga case was widely criticized for being 
over 600 pages. See, e.g., Dapo Akande, ICC Delivers Its First Judgment: The Lubanga Case and 
Classification of Conflicts in Situations of Occupation, EJIL TALK (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.ejil 
talk.org/icc-delivers-its-first-judgment-the-lubanga-case; Dov Jacobs, First Judgment at the ICC: 
Some Random Thoughts, SPREADING THE JAM (Mar. 14, 2012), http://dovjacobs.blogspot.com/ 
2012/03/first-judgment-at-icc-some-random.html. 
 176. Cf. Ford, supra note 161, at 410 (suggesting that perceived legitimacy is largely a product of 
whom is indicted). The reaction to the ICC’s recent acquittal of alleged Congolese warlord Mathieu 
Ngudjolo is instructive. See generally David Smith, ICC Acquits Congolese Militia Leader Over 
Atrocities, GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/dec/18/icc-acquits-
congolese-militia-leader-atrocities (noting that prominent NGOs and international lawyers attributed 
Ngudjolo’s acquittal to the poor quality of the ICC’s prosecutions). 
 177. See Robinson, supra note 3, at 929; see generally NANCY A. COMBS, FACT-FINDING 
WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS 228–30 (2010) (describing reasons for ICTs’ pro-conviction bias). 
 178. The United States Supreme Court has been described, for example, as a super-legislature. 
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the 
Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 590 (2009); Richard A. Posner, The 
Supreme Court 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 60 (2005). 
 179. See Markovic, supra note 57, at 216; see also Elena Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, 14 
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 121, 122 (2009) (“Lacking its own police force, the ICC depends 
on state cooperation to conduct its investigations, enforce arrest warrants, and carry out other basic 
functions.”). 
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documentary evidence has not figured prominently in international 
criminal trials since Nuremberg, and prosecutors have been forced to 
depend primarily on eyewitness testimony.180  
Eyewitness testimony is notoriously unreliable in domestic criminal 
trials181 and could be even more unreliable in international criminal trials. 
One reason is the existence of significant cultural differences between 
witnesses and staff.182 Western judges, for example, are known to expect 
trustworthy witnesses to maintain eye contact while witnesses from non-
Western cultures tend to avert their eyes out of respect.183 A particular 
issue for the ICTR has been that some witnesses who have appeared 
before it do not conceive of distance in arithmetic or geographic terms.184 
Even if one assumes that these cultural differences will be less salient 
when a judge and the majority of witnesses share the same nationality,185 
many of the witnesses will be unfamiliar with the procedures used by 
ICTs.186 The fact that international criminal trials often occur years after 
the underlying events makes witness testimony all the more unreliable.187   
Since eyewitness testimony can be highly unreliable but is nevertheless 
integral to modern war crimes trials, judges at the ICC and other ICTs will 
often have good cause to credit or discredit eyewitness testimony in cases 
involving crimes allegedly committed by or against their nationals, as well 
as other cases that strongly affect national interests. A number of 
 
 
 180. See COMBS, supra note 177, at 6, 11–12; see also Patricia M. Wald, Dealing with Witnesses 
in War Crime Trials: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 217, 219 
(2002) (“[I]n most cases [the ICTY] needed substantial numbers of eyewitnesses to prove crimes had 
occurred . . . .”). As Combs observes, the Nazi regime was atypical in its mania for recording its many 
crimes. See COMBS, supra note 177, at 11. 
 181. See, e.g., COMBS, supra note 177, at 6; Noah Clements, Flipping a Coin: A Solution for the 
Inherent Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 40 IND. L. REV. 271, 271 (2007); 
Richard A. Wise et al., A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 
811–12 (2007). 
 182. See COMBS, supra note 177, at 4; see also Joshua Karton, Lost in Translation: International 
Criminal Tribunals and the Legal Implications of Interpreted Testimony, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
1, 5 (2008) (suggesting that inaccuracies introduced by interpretation process can impede ICTs’ search 
for truth).  
 183. See COMBS, supra note 177, at 80 (summarizing research involving immigrant witnesses in 
the United States). 
 184. See id. at 81–82 (citations omitted). 
 185. There can be, of course, significant cultural differences within countries. See David M. 
Crane, White Man’s Justice: Applying International Justice After Regional Third World Conflicts, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1683, 1686 (2012) (describing justice as “locally, culturally oriented” vis-à-vis 
Africa).  
 186. See COMBS, supra note 177, at 4.  
 187. See Ruth Wedgwood, War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Comments on the International 
War Crimes Tribunal, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 267, 269 (1994) (emphasizing the importance of fresh and 
immediate eyewitness testimony). 
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prominent international criminal trials have turned on differences of 
opinion concerning the credibility of key witnesses, but judges could 
question the reliability of testimony in virtually every international 
criminal trial. Nancy Combs’s study of trial transcripts at the ICTR and 
SCSL reveals, for example, that more than fifty percent of prosecution 
witnesses testified in ways that were seriously inconsistent with their 
pretrial statements.188  
The ICTY’s handing of crucial testimony in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic 
offers a vivid illustration.189 In this case, the ICTY Trial Chamber heard 
testimony from an eyewitness who had identified the defendants as having 
perpetrated an attack upon her village.190 However, in her pre-trial 
statements she claimed that she had seen her father killed by gunfire and 
the defendants set fire to the upper floor of her family home.191 These 
claims were repudiated during her testimony.192 The Trial Chamber found 
the witness to be credible because she had never wavered in her 
identification of the defendants, whereas the Appeals Chamber held that 
reliance on the witness’s testimony had been “wholly erroneous” based on 
the aforementioned inconsistencies.193   
Kupreskic is somewhat anomalous because ICT judges rarely 
emphasize discrepancies in witness testimony.194 For example, in the CDF 
case, the SCSL heard important testimony from an alleged comrade of the 
defendants who claimed that he had tortured and cut off the ear of a man 
named Joseph Lansana from Sorgia and killed his mother on orders from 
the defendants.195 The defense called Mr. Lansana to testify.196 He stated 
that his mother had died before the events in question and then 
dramatically displayed his intact ears to the court.197 The Trial Chamber 
overlooked these conspicuous inconsistencies in what was the crucial 
testimony against the CDF defendants and convicted them.198  
 
 
 188. COMBS, supra note 177, at 5. 
 189. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 223 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23, 2001). 
 190. See id.  
 191. Id. ¶¶ 223–24. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. ¶ 224. 
 194. COMBS, supra note 177, at 8. 
 195. Id. at 211. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See id. at 212–13. The judgment was sustained on appeal. See Prosecutor v. Fofana and 
Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 565 (May 28, 2008). 
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The judgments in Kupreskic and the CDF case tend to suggest that 
judges can, without fear of substantial criticism, either ignore 
discrepancies in the evidence so as to convict a defendant or emphasize 
these discrepancies to justify an acquittal. Most international criminal 
trials may not involve clear contradictions in testimony, but witness 
testimony will rarely be so convincing and incontrovertible that it will 
compel judges at the ICC and other ICTs to rule in a particular manner.199 
In most international criminal trials, the evidence will be sufficiently 
ambiguous such that it can be consciously or unconsciously interpreted to 
fit a preferred outcome.   
b. Indeterminacy of Legal Analysis  
Judges at the ICC and other ICTs also have a great deal of discretion in 
terms of legal analysis. This can be partly attributed to the relative 
newness of the international criminal law regime but also because 
international criminal law purports to punish human rights violators and 
vindicate the rights of victims while fully safeguarding the rights of 
defendants.200 This inevitably leads to conflict because, as Mirjan 
Damaska has observed, “[w]hen the interests of the criminal defendant and 
victims both vie for judicial attention, a point is soon reached beyond 
which the desire to satisfy the victims’ interests begins to impinge on 
considerations of fairness toward the defendants.”201 The ICTY has used 
the protection of victims’ rights as one of its main rationales to justify the 
extrapolation of the Geneva Conventions’ provisions concerning 
international armed conflicts to internal conflicts and to expand the scope 
of command responsibility.202  
This jurisprudential conflict between the rights of victims and 
defendants was starkly exhibited in the ICC Appeals Chamber’s decision 
concerning the participation of victims in ICC trial proceedings.203 
 
 
 199. See also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 64 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (“[T]wo judges, both acting reasonably, can come to 
different conclusions on the basis of the same evidence.”).   
 200. See generally Robinson, supra note 3, at 930–31 (postulating that there is an identity crisis in 
international criminal law because of its inability to reconcile the protection of human rights with the 
protection of the rights of criminal defendants). 
 201. Damaska, supra note 58, at 334. 
 202. Robinson, supra note 3, at 936–37; see also Damaska, supra note 58, at 356 (criticizing ICTs 
for applying tenuous doctrines of criminal participation and loosening evidentiary requirements).   
 203. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, Judgment on the Appeals of the 
Prosecutor and the Defence Against the Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 19 
January 2008, ¶ 109 (July 11, 2008). 
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Although the ICC Statute does not explicitly grant victims the right to 
present evidence or challenge the admissibility of evidence, a majority of 
the Appeals Chamber held that: 
To give effect to the spirit and intention of . . . the Statute in the 
context of trial proceedings [the victim participation provisions] 
must be interpreted so as to make participation by victims 
meaningful . . . . If victims were generally and under all 
circumstances precluded from tendering evidence relating to the 
guilt or innocence of the accused and from challenging the 
admissibility or relevance of evidence, their right to participate in 
the trial would potentially become ineffectual.204  
The dissents by Judges Pikis and Kirsch conversely focused on, inter alia, 
the imposition that such robust participation would have on the fair trial 
rights of the defendant.205   
Judges at the ICC and other ICTs do not necessarily err when they 
interpret legal materials in such a way as to maximize the rights and 
interests of victims, particularly when deciding issues of first impression, 
but they might equally reasonably be focused on a defendant’s entitlement 
to a fair trial.206 A judge who is concerned with domestic political interests 
can reasonably prioritize one set of rights over another to consciously or 
unconsciously achieve a preferred outcome.    
Even where the law seems relatively clear, a judge may offer a novel 
interpretation of the law based on the unique facts of a given case. A 
notable example is Justice Thompson’s dissent in the CDF case.207 The 
CDF case involved Sierra Leonean defendants who were alleged to have 
committed war crimes while fighting to restore the country’s 
 
 
 204. Id. ¶ 97. 
 205. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, Partly Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Pikis, ¶ 19 (July 11, 2008); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, Partly 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kirsch, ¶ 23 (July 12, 2008) (“[D]etermining that it is the parties that lead 
evidence on guilt or innocence, and not the victims, is consistent with the overall desire to ensure that 
proceedings at the ICC are both fair and expeditious.”).   
 206. Presumably as international criminal law—including the ICC in particular—continues to 
develop and expand its jurisprudence, it will favor victims with respect to certain legal issues and favor 
defendants with respect to others. But even then, reasonable judges will disagree as to precise contours 
of each group’s rights and how to apply the developed legal doctrine to the cases before them. See also 
Damaska, supra note 58, at 333–34 (suggesting that conflicts between victims’ and defendants’ rights 
implicate more fundamental questions concerning procedural justice versus substantive justice).  
 207. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Separate Concurring and Partially Dissenting 
Opinion of Hon. Justice Bankole Thompson Filed Pursuant to Article 18 of the Statute, ¶ 1 (Aug. 2, 
2007) [hereinafter Thompson Dissent].  
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democratically elected government.208 The chief defendant, Sam Hinga 
Norman, had been a minister in the Sierra Leonean government prior to 
his indictment.209  
Norman died before trial,210 and the other CDF defendants were 
convicted by the SCSL.211 Justice Thompson, a national of Sierra Leone, 
dissented from the Trial Chamber’s judgment, however, on the basis that 
the defendants’ crimes could be excused by the defenses of necessity and 
Salus Civis Suprema Lex Est.212  
Justice Thompson’s dissent is notable apart from the commonality 
between his nationality and that of the CDF defendants. Justice Thompson 
raised the defenses of necessity and Salus Civis Suprema Lex Est213 sua 
sponte although neither defense is mentioned in the SCSL Statute. 
Moreover, no ICT has ever held that necessity or Salus Civis Suprema Lex 
Est could be used as a justification or excuse for war crimes, and 
precedents from Nuremberg would seem to prohibit, or at least greatly 
restrict, such defenses.214    
The reliance on the Salus Civis Suprema Lex Est defense seems 
especially questionable. Justice Thompson addresses it in five short 
paragraphs without a citation to any authority that suggests that the 
doctrine is a recognized defense to war crimes.215 The defense is also 
difficult to reconcile with the text of the SCSL Statute, which provides that 
“[t]he fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a 
Government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal 
 
 
 208. See Jane Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict: What Impact on 
Building the Rule of Law?, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 251, 302 (2007).  
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 303. 
 211. See Discussion Part II.B.3.a supra.  
 212. Thompson Dissent, supra note 207, ¶¶ 69, 93. Salus Civis Suprema Lex Est means “the 
safety of the state is the supreme law.” Id. ¶ 93. 
 213. Id. ¶ 4. 
 214. See United States v. Wilhelm List et al., (“Hostage Case”), 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 757, 1272 
(1948), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-XI.pdf 
(“[T]he rules of international law must be followed even if it results in the loss of a battle or even a 
war.”); see also U.N. War Crimes Comm’n, The Krupp Trial, 10 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS 147, 149 (1948), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_ 
Vol-10.pdf (suggesting that the necessity defense is only available when “the act charged was done to 
avoid an evil, severe and irreparable; that there was no other adequate means of escape; and that the 
remedy was not disproportionate to the evil.”).  
 215. Thompson cites to Kant, Salmond, and a Supreme Court of Sierra Leone opinion that 
establishes only that the State has a monopoly on force within its territory. Thompson Dissent, supra 
note 207, ¶¶ 94–96. 
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responsibility.”216 If a specific government order to commit an act will not 
excuse the act, then it would seem to follow that the act should not be 
excused when the defendant commits the act to protect the state of his or 
her own accord. Justice Thompson did not address this problematic 
language in the SCSL Statute. 
Justice Thompson’s rationale for invoking the necessity defense is 
more convincing. He notes that the ICJ has recognized the defense and 
that many municipal systems similarly allow for it.217 However, neither of 
the ICJ cases he cites relates to international criminal law nor addresses 
whether the necessity defense should be available in a prosecution for war 
crimes.218 Justice Thompson also fails to explain why the defendants’ 
commission of crimes against humanity and war crimes were necessary to 
restore Sierra Leone’s government. In his view, because the defendants 
were “fighting for the restoration of democracy and constitutional 
legitimacy . . . [this compelled] disobedience to a supranational regime of 
proscriptive norms.”219 Under Justice Thompson’s formulation of the 
defense, any war crime committed as part of a just war should be excused. 
Although Justice Thompson’s dissent may be unconvincing, it is not 
self-evidently specious. The SCSL Statute does not specifically prohibit 
either the necessity or Salus Civis Suprema Lex Est defense. The ICC 
Statute and municipal law in many nations do provide for a necessity 
defense.220 In addition, the mere fact that the acceptance of these defenses 
may be novel in the context of a war crimes prosecution does not mean 
that they are inapplicable.221 Defenses that originally apply in one context 
are sometimes recognized to extend to related contexts.222  
 
 
 216. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6(4), Aug. 14, 2000, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138 
[hereinafter SCSL Statute], available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJe 
Ew%3d&tabid=176. 
 217. Thompson Dissent, supra note 207, ¶¶ 77, 79–80, 84. 
 218. ZOILA HINSON, SIERRA LEONE COURT MONITORING PROGRAMME, JUSTICE BANKOLE 
THOMPSON’S OPINION IN THE CDF CASE: A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 7 (2007), available at http:// 
www.carl-sl.org/home/images/stories/essay/Essay_Series_I.pdf. 
 219. Thompson Dissent, supra note 207, ¶ 90. 
 220. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 31(1)(c); Thompson Dissent, supra note 207, ¶¶ 80–81. 
 221. Indeed, in recognizing the necessity defense, see ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 31(1)(d), the 
ICC Statute appears to contemplate that it will be raised in the context of a prosecution of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes because the ICC has jurisdiction only over such crimes. See id. art. 5.   
 222. Self-defense, for example, justifies the defense of others. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05(1) 
(1962). The right of self-defense under customary international law has also been viewed as the basis 
for the humanitarian intervention doctrine. See David Rodin, The Liability of Ordinary Soldiers for 
Crimes of Aggression, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 591, 592 (2007) (“If one interprets self-
defense to include the defense of others, then it is also possible to view the emerging norm of 
humanitarian intervention as part of the extended right of self and other-defense.”). 
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Even if one strongly disagrees with Justice Thompson’s dissent, it is 
unclear that the legal analysis is so erroneous that it must have been 
motivated by a conscious or unconscious desire to acquit the CDF fighters. 
While Justice Thompson was unable to convince his international 
colleagues on the SCSL Trial Chamber to acquit the CDF defendants, the 
Chamber did use the fact that the CDF defendants had been fighting a just 
war as a mitigating factor at sentencing.223 The Trial Chamber imposed 
sentences of six and eight years imprisonment compared to sentences of 
forty-five and fifty years that had previously been imposed upon rebel 
defendants.224 The sentencing judgment was ultimately reversed by the 
SCSL Appeals Chamber, however, and the defendants’ sentences were 
increased to fifteen and twenty years.225 The Appeals Chamber’s one 
Sierra Leonean justice would have maintained the lower sentences.226  
Whether Justice Thompson was influenced by domestic considerations 
or self-interest is unknowable.227 If he had been so influenced, this would 
not have necessarily undermined the work of the SCSL because hybrid 
tribunals seek to reflect local sentiment, and the service of nationals on 
such courts is intended to foster local ownership of the proceedings.228 As 
an SCSL justice, Justice Thompson was not representing “the international 
community as a whole” as he would have been if he served on the ICC.229 
But rarely will the facts or law of a case be so clear that ICT judges will be 
unable to give effect to their national biases and even arguably specious 
opinions cannot necessarily be attributed to a judge’s failure to maintain 
independence and impartiality.  
 
 
 223. Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment on the Sentencing of 
Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, ¶¶ 79–91 (Oct. 9, 2007). 
 224. Id., Disposition.   
 225. Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 565 (May 28, 
2008). 
 226. Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-01-14-A, Partially Dissenting Opinion 
of Honourable Justice George Gebaga King, ¶¶ 26–31 (May 28, 2008). 
 227. Justice Thompson was nominated by Sierra Leone to the ICC in 2011, but he was not elected. 
See ICC Election of Judges, December 2011—Results of the First Round, INT’L CRIM. COURT (Dec. 
15, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/elections/judges/2011/results/Pages/1st%20round.aspx. 
 228. See David Cohen, “Hybrid Justice” in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: Lessons 
Learned and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 2, 6 (2007). But see Elizabeth Burch, 
Hybrid Courts: Examining Hybridity Through a Post-Colonial Lens, 28 B.U. INT’L L. J. 1, 12 (2010) 
(describing local participation as a veneer to mask sharp differences between international and national 
justice). 
 229. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1). 
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III. OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED 
Thus far this Article has contended that judges at the ICC and future 
ICTs cannot be expected to separate themselves from their national 
identities in cases involving crimes allegedly committed by or against their 
nationals. Judges should also consider voluntarily recusing themselves in 
other cases that strongly implicate the interests of their nations. This Part 
will explore whether this Article’s focus on national identity is 
counterproductive to the advancement of international criminal justice and 
fails to account for the increasing cosmopolitanism of judges at the ICC 
and other ICTs. This Part will also address whether recusal should be 
automatic in cases involving crimes committed by or against a judge’s 
fellow nationals.    
A. The Legitimacy of International Criminal Trials 
For the ICC and future ICTs to fulfill their goals, they must be 
perceived to mete out justice fairly and impartially.230 In particular, to 
promote “truth and reconciliation,” the individuals and nations most 
affected by the crimes at issue must accept international criminal trials as 
legitimate.231  
One of the main challenges facing the ICC and future ICTs is that there 
will often be a “mismatch” between domestic narratives surrounding a 
conflict and what actually transpired.232 This mismatch will make it 
difficult for the parties to a conflict to accept international criminal trials 
as legitimate.233 In the long term, however, ICTs may be able break down 
the erroneous narratives perpetrated by the conflict’s participants and force 
them to take responsibility for their actions.234 For example, opinion of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal was overwhelmingly negative in West Germany in 
the 1950s.235 In the 1970s and 1980s, however, West Germans began to 
acknowledge the enormity of their nation’s crimes in World War II based 
 
 
 230. See Kirsch, supra note 3, at 506. 
 231. See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist Process 
Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 3–4 (2010); William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of 
International Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729, 736–37 
(2003). 
 232. See Ford, supra note 161, at 411.  
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See id. at 469 (citing Christoph Burchard, The Nuremberg Trial and Its Impact on Germany, 
4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 800, 812–13 (2006)). 
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in part on evidence collected by the Nuremberg Tribunal.236 The ICTY has 
also had some success in convincing Serbs of the occurrence of crimes 
such as the shelling of Sarajevo and the Srebrenica massacre after years of 
disbelief and resistance.237  
One potential objection to this Article’s proposal that judges at the ICC 
and other ICTs be disqualified from certain trials on the basis of 
nationality is that it risks undermining international criminal justice by 
deflecting attention away from the crimes committed by the parties to a 
conflict. To dismiss inconvenient legal conclusions from the ICC and 
other ICTs, the parties can claim that the judges are biased because of 
national allegiances or other personal traits. Such claims are difficult to 
disprove.    
If the main purpose of international criminal trials is to combat “mass 
denial”238 on the part of a conflict’s participants, then any criticism of 
ICTs could be seen as counterproductive to the fulfillment of this goal. 
However, acknowledging and accounting for national bias in certain cases 
can help to legitimize the work of ICTs by making charges of “victor’s 
justice” appear less credible.239 Indeed, perhaps part of the reason for the 
slow acceptance of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the ICTY by the people of 
Germany and Serbia respectively is because these tribunals were staffed in 
ways that inevitably raised concerns about their impartiality. As noted, 
only judges from the major Allied Powers were permitted to sit on the 
Nuremberg Tribunal,240 and judges from the major NATO countries have 
been de facto guaranteed ICTY judgeships if they desired them by virtue 
of their membership on the United Nations Security Council.241    
Although no judge may be fully disinterested when adjudicating crimes 
that “deeply shock the conscience of humanity,”242 some judges can more 
credibly claim to be disinterested than others. For example, judges from 
democratic South American countries—that had little at stake in the 
Yugoslavia conflict—would have presumably been ideal appointees to the 
 
 
 236. Id. 
 237. See id. at 470–71 (internal citations omitted). 
 238. Jean Galbraith, The Pace of International Criminal Justice, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 79, 88 
(2010). 
 239. See generally Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
915, 921–23 (2003) (noting that claims regarding the ICTY as “victor’s justice” resonated in Serbia 
because the Security Council created the ICTY, and it was not a neutral party to the Yugoslavia 
conflict).   
 240. IMT Charter, supra note 5, art. 2. 
 241. Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 48; Scharf, supra note 239, at 921. 
 242. ICC Statute, supra note 6, pmbl. 
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ICTY.243 Research suggests that these judges were underrepresented at the 
expense of Western judges who had a far greater interest in the conflict.244 
In fact, if the primary goal of the ICTY was to break down erroneous 
domestic narratives about the Yugoslavia conflict, the ICTY should have 
been staffed with judges from nations in which the participants to the 
Yugoslavia conflict placed trust.245 The ICTY’s first judicial election, 
however, saw the defeat of Russia’s nominee because a majority of the 
Security Council apparently feared that he would be partial to Serbia.246     
The mere recognition that national bias may impact some international 
criminal trials does not mean that it is a factor in all trials. Cases involving 
crimes allegedly committed by or against a judge’s fellow nationals are 
unique because a judge cannot reasonably be expected to psychologically 
separate himself or herself from his or her national community. In such 
cases there will be more pressure to rule in accordance with the national 
will. This Article does not claim that judges cannot act as representatives 
of the “international community as a whole”247 in trials that do not 
implicate these concerns.  
This Article has also proposed that judges at the ICC and other ICTs 
consider whether their nations’ involvement in a particular conflict might 
raise concerns about their impartiality in other cases that do not involve 
crimes allegedly committed by or against their fellow nationals.248 An 
example would be a case related to a conflict in which a judge’s nation has 
been arming one side. In such a situation, the judge may not have a 
psychological connection to either of the warring parties, but it may 
nevertheless be in his or her self-interest to sympathize with the side 
supported by his or her home state. The judge would also very likely be 
viewed as partial to that side. For these reasons, the judge should consider 
recusing himself or herself but need not do so because support for one side 
of a conflict is not necessarily incompatible with seeking to ensure that no 
 
 
 243. Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 49. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE US 54–
55 (2009) (“An attempted refutation by an untrustworthy source can be taken as additional evidence in 
favor of [false] beliefs. . . . If people . . . have a degree of trust in those who are providing the 
correction, then false beliefs will dissipate.”).  
 246. See Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 49. This is not to say that the Security Council was 
wrong to consider whether the Russian judge might be partial to Serbia, but it should have also 
considered whether NATO judges might be partial (or be seen to be partial) to other participants in the 
Yugoslavia conflict. 
 247. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1). 
 248. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2011) (requiring U.S. federal judges to disqualify themselves in 
any proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
42 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:1 
 
 
 
 
crimes committed in that conflict go unpunished.249 Any recusal decision 
would, of course, be subject to review by his or her colleagues.250 To 
appear as neutral as possible, however, ICTs would ideally try defendants 
before chambers that consist of judges from nations that have little vested 
interested in the conflict. 
B. Cosmopolitan Judges 
This Article’s focus on nationality as a salient personal characteristic 
could also be seen as outdated. Although the state has historically been the 
chief source in the shaping of personal identity,251 identity has become 
more complex and subjective with globalization and the increasing 
movement of individuals across borders.252 Thomas Franck has claimed 
that “[N]ationalism is in retreat. . . . [I]ndividualism has emerged . . . as an 
increasingly preferred alternative to self-definition imposed by 
nationalism’s genetic and territorial imperatives.”253 The philosopher 
Martha Nussbaum has referred to nationality as a “morally irrelevant 
characteristic” and has suggested that national citizenship should give way 
to “cosmopolitanism,” whereby each person is first and foremost “a citizen 
of the world” and “puts right before country and universal reason before 
the symbols of belonging.”254 
Such ideas are not new, of course. Cosmopolitanism originated with 
the Greek stoic philosopher Diogenes Laertius.255 However, in an 
increasingly globalized world, it is conceivable that national citizenship 
has begun to give way to a more universal citizenship.256 The European 
Union (“EU”) originally began as an organization devoted to economic 
integration but is increasingly legislating in other areas in order “to 
construct an identity for the Union that goes beyond economic issues and 
 
 
 249. This would particularly be the case if the judge’s home nation consistently condemned war 
crimes committed by all sides of the conflict.  
 250. Potential problems with judicial review of disqualification motions are acknowledged infra 
Part III.C. 
 251. See FRANCK, supra note 30, at 6. 
 252. See id. at 9–10. 
 253. Id. at 1. 
 254. Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 5, 6, 17. 
 255. See id. at 6. 
 256. See Smith, supra note 103, at 224. But see Denis Sindic, National Identities: Are They 
Declining?, BEYOND CURRENT HORIZONS 6 (Dec. 2008), http://www.beyondcurrenthorizons.org.uk/ 
wp-content/uploads/final_sindic_nationalidentities_20081201.pdf (reviewing studies that indicate that 
internet use strengthens nationalist identities). 
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can therefore claim deeper bonds of allegiance over time.”257 Future 
generations of Europeans might view themselves primarily as “European” 
or even “citizens of the world” as opposed to nationals of specific states.          
Even if cosmopolitan identities do not become ascendant, international 
judges would seem to be far more cosmopolitan than their fellow 
nationals. The proliferation of international tribunals has created a global 
community of international judges who see one another “‘not only as 
servants and representatives of a particular polity, but also as fellow 
professionals in a common judicial enterprise that transcends national 
borders.’”258 International judges tend to share similar educational and 
professional experiences and are increasingly exhibiting a shared 
understanding of the judicial function.259  
With respect to ICT judges in particular, their expected qualifications 
are becoming standardized,260 and groups such as the Independent Panel 
on ICC Judicial Elections press state parties to nominate only the most 
highly qualified candidates to the ICC.261  ICT judges network and many 
will end up serving on more than one ICT.262 Disqualifying judges from 
international criminal trials on the basis of nationality might seem 
unnecessary at a time when states are able to draw on a highly professional 
community of ICT judges devoted to the development of shared norms 
and practices.263  
Although globalization and other such forces have undoubtedly 
changed the way individuals conceptualize their national identities, there is 
little data to support the view that national identities are growing weaker, 
let alone being replaced by cosmopolitan identities.264 Eurobarometer data 
shows that only a small percentage of Europeans reject all sense of 
national pride, and national pride has actually increased in most European 
 
 
 257. Jenia Iontcheva Turner, The Expressive Dimensions of EU Criminal Law, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 
555, 573 (2012); see also Kathleen R. McNamara, Constructing Authority in the European Union, in 
WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE?, supra note 29, at 166–73 (describing various mechanisms used by the 
EU to construct “an image of a bounded political and social space”). 
 258. Daniel Terris et al., Toward a Community of International Judges, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 419, 420 (2008) (quoting Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 193 (2003)). 
 259. Id. at 419; see also Smith, supra note 103, at 224 (suggesting that international judges form a 
homogeneous epistemic community).  
 260. See Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 58.  
 261. See INDEPENDENT PANEL ON ICC JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, http://www.iccindependentpanel.org/ 
about (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).  
 262. Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 46. 
 263. Id. 
 264. See Denis Sindic, Psychological Citizenship and National Identity, 21 J. COMM. APPL. SOC. 
PSYCH. 202, 209 (2011). 
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countries since the founding of the EU.265 Attachments to Europe are in 
fact significantly weaker than national attachments.266 Prominent EU 
supporters have suggested that EU membership may actually foster 
stronger national allegiances.267 There is no reason to believe that a 
commitment to cosmopolitanism is incompatible with a strong sense of 
national identity.268    
It is also possible that when individuals identify as “European” or 
“citizens of the world,” they are primarily seeking to disassociate 
themselves from some of the negative connotations associated with a 
surfeit of national pride.269 Many aspects of national identity are banal and 
taken for granted until one’s national identity is threatened.270 National 
identity is highly likely, however, to assume far more importance at a time 
of crisis such as a war.271 
Judges are nominated to serve on the ICC and other ICTs by states, and 
judges will be at least somewhat beholden to their states’ views and 
interests. But even if nomination practices were to change and ICT judges 
were to embrace cosmopolitanism, ICT judges might still fail to represent 
international norms and values in all cases.  
This is because cosmopolitan judges will be prone to underestimate 
their own latent national biases. The psychological phenomenon of 
discrediting views of oneself that threaten one’s membership in a group is 
known as identity-protective cognition.272 A cosmopolitan judge would be 
disinclined to consider that his or her view of a case might be affected by 
his or her national identity, even if his or her nation’s interests were very 
much implicated in the case.273 Identity-protective cognition might also 
lead judges at the ICC and other ICTs to take for granted that they are 
disseminating international legal norms and values, notwithstanding 
 
 
 265. See id. at 207. 
 266. See Sindic, supra note 256, at 7. 
 267. Id. at 8. 
 268. See also Hilary Putnam, Must We Choose, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY?, supra note 30, at 97 
(“We all have to live and judge from within our particular inheritances . . . . [W]e do not have to 
choose between patriotism and universal reason; critical intelligence and loyalty to what is best in our 
traditions, including our national and ethnic traditions, are interdependent.”). 
 269. See Sindic, supra note 264, at 209.  
 270. Id. at 206; Sindic, supra note 256, at 3.  
 271. Sindic, supra note 256, at 3. 
 272. See Kahan, supra note 145, at 20–21. 
 273. See Terris, supra note 258, at 421 (“[A]n overdeveloped sense of community among judges 
has the potential to lead to a form of ‘corporate solidarity’ that could deflect constructive criticism and 
stifle new thinking.”); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 245, at 89 (noting that insulated groups tend to 
suppress dissent and exhibit worse decision-making). 
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longstanding concerns that ICTs are dominated by Anglo-Saxon legal 
norms and values.274  
This is not to say that judges at the ICC and other ICTs should eschew 
cosmopolitanism. However, regardless of a judge’s sense of self, national 
bias is likely to impact his or her decision-making in cases that are of most 
interest to his or her nation. Nor will cosmopolitan judges necessarily 
reflect the international community and its interests better than judges who 
understand that they are connected to the international community largely 
through their relationships to their own states.275   
C. Are Automatic Recusals Necessary? 
This Article has proposed that judges be automatically disqualified 
from hearing cases involving crimes committed by or against their fellow 
nationals but not in other cases that might implicate their nations’ 
interests. ICTs have procedures to adjudicate disqualification motions, 
however, and do not rely on individual judges to assess their own 
biases.276 If a judge is in the position to hear a case in which his or her 
nationality is highly relevant and he or she does not recuse himself or 
herself, the judge can presumably be disqualified by his or her colleagues, 
rendering automatic disqualifications unnecessary.  
The prospect that judges at the ICC and other ICTs will disqualify 
colleagues on nationality-based grounds is highly remote. In the first 
place, for a judge’s role to be scrutinized in a given case, a party must 
move for the judge’s disqualification. However, defense counsel may fear 
that a failed disqualification motion will cause the judge to be negatively 
predisposed towards the accused. Conversely, defense counsel may 
believe that national bias will augur in the accused’s favor. Prosecutors 
 
 
 274. See Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 46 (noting perception that ICTs are dominated by 
Anglo-Saxon norms and practices); see also Makau Mutua, Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav 
and Rwanda Tribunals, 11 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 167, 168 (1997) (claiming that the Nuremberg 
Tribunal marked the beginning of the ascendancy of Anglo-Saxon legal hegemony).  
 275. Michael Walzer has suggested in response to Nussbaum that allegiances should be 
understood as forming a series of concentric circles and that “we begin by understanding what it 
means to have fellow citizens and neighbors; without that understanding, we are morally lost. Then we 
extend the sense of moral fellowship . . . to new groups of people, and ultimately to all people.” 
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Affection, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY?, supra note 30, at 126.   
 276. The ICTY’s Bureau, which consists of the President, the Vice-President, and the Presiding 
Judges of the Trial Chambers, decides disqualification motions at the ICTY. See Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia, R. P. Evid. 2 & 15(b), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 46 (2011), available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/it032rev46e.pdf. The ICC 
resolves disqualification motions in a plenary session of all of its judges. ICC Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, supra note 92, Rule 4(2). 
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may be reluctant to make disqualification motions altogether since they 
appear before the same judges in different cases.277 An ICT’s legitimacy 
may also be undermined by the time the disqualification motion is 
made.278 
When parties have moved to disqualify ICT judges on nationality-
based grounds, their motions have been rejected.279 This is not entirely 
surprising because judges tend to be reluctant to question the 
independence and impartiality of fellow judges,280 and in past cases where 
defendants have sought to disqualify judges on nationality-based grounds, 
the impugned judges have stridently proclaimed their independence and 
impartiality.281 To grant disqualification motions under such circumstances 
would require rebuking colleagues. By acknowledging that a judge’s 
nationality can impact his or her decision-making, ICT judges would also 
legitimize nationality-based challenges to their own independence and 
impartiality in future cases. All ICT judges are nationals of certain states 
and would not have been elected without support from their states.   
Even assuming that ICTs were prepared to recognize the existence of 
national bias, they cannot discern either its effect on specific judges or in 
which cases it will appear. There are no reliable indicia of a judge’s 
identification with his or her national polity or whether he or she is under 
 
 
 277. See also Richard E. Flamm, History and Problems With the Federal Disqualification 
Framework, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 751, 762 (2010) (“Although a litigant is unlikely to appear before a 
particular judge again, and therefore may feel that she has little to lose in seeking that judge’s removal, 
an attorney who frequently handles litigation in federal court is likely to be less than eager to make or 
endorse a recusal motion for one client if she perceives that doing so may prejudice her ability to 
effectively litigate before that judge in future cases.”).  
 278. See Dmitry Bam, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias, 2011 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 943, 973 (“[B]y the time the recusal decision is ultimately made and publicized, the 
public has already observed the conduct and the events that negatively affect its perception of the 
judiciary and formed its own, often negative, opinions about judicial impartiality.”). This effect is 
likely amplified in the international realm because most citizens will only begin to closely follow the 
work of an ICT such as the ICC when it adjudicates cases involving their countries, and initial 
impressions of bias may be difficult to overcome. See also id. at 974 (suggesting that recusal does not 
fully restore faith in the impartiality of the proceedings) (citations omitted).   
 279. See discussion supra Introduction. 
 280. See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters Again, 30 REV. 
LITIG. 671, 728–29 (2011) (discussing judges’ ambivalence towards disqualification motions and 
tendency to err on the side of non-disqualification); see also Patricia M. Wald, Judging War Crimes, 1 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 189, 196 (2000) (suggesting that the ICTY is more collegial than domestic courts). 
 281. See Prosecutor v. Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-PT, Order Denying Defence Motion Pursuant 
to Rule 15(B) Seeking Disqualification of Presiding Judge Alphons Orie and for a Stay of 
Proceedings, annex, ¶ 60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 15, 2012); Prosecutor v. 
Nourain & Jamus, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09-344-Anx, Decision of the Plenary of the Judges on the 
“Defence Request for the Disqualification of a Judge” of 2 April 2012, ¶ 8 (June 5, 2012) (noting that 
“a number of judges expressed concerns about the length and tone of [Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji’s] 
submission” on his recusal). 
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conscious or subconscious pressure to rule in a particular manner.282 The 
lack of clear judiciable standards in assessing nationality-based 
disqualification necessitates a prophylactic rule for those cases where 
national bias is most likely to have an effect. Not every judge will be 
incapable of maintaining impartiality and independence in cases involving 
crimes committed by or against his or her fellow nationals, but national 
bias is likely to be more prevalent and significant in such cases.  
CONCLUSION 
Although international criminal trials since Nuremberg have been 
perceived to be fair and impartial,283 a growing literature has begun to 
question core assumptions concerning ICTs, including whether their 
proceedings are substantively biased against defendants.284 This Article 
has sought to challenge another core assumption, that an ICT judge’s 
nationality has no bearing on his or her decision-making.   
The ICTR and ICTY have held that national identity is irrelevant to 
how a judge performs his or her duties, while the ICC has permitted a 
Ugandan judge to hear an appeal involving the LRA285 and a Nigerian 
judge to adjudicate attacks on Nigerian peacekeepers.286 ICTs are 
anomalous among international tribunals in failing to control for national 
bias even though nominations to ICTs are controlled by states, and few 
tribunals hear cases as sensitive and controversial as ICTs.   
 
 
 282. This is illustrated by the summary nature of ICTs’ analysis of nationality-based 
disqualification motions. For example, the ICC disposed of the claim that Nigerian Judge Chile Eboe-
Osuji should be disqualified from a case where the alleged victims were predominately Nigerians in a 
single paragraph. See Prosecutor v. Nourain & Jamus, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09-344-Anx, Decision 
of the Plenary of the Judges on the “Defence Request for the Disqualification of a Judge” of 2 April 
2012, ¶ 15 (June 5, 2012); see also Introduction, supra (discussing disqualification motion filed by 
Mladić defense team). 
 283. See Ford, supra note 161, at 415; Stromseth, supra note 208, at 319–20; Antonio Cassese, 
The ICTY: A Living and Vital Reality, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 585, 586 (2004) (“[T]he ICTY not only 
got off the ground but has since proved to be a superb judicial enterprise, capable of dispensing justice 
in a fair manner . . .”); see also Turner, supra note 59, at 582 (noting that a majority of ICTY and 
ICTR defense attorneys believed the proceedings to be apolitical).  
 284. See supra note 177. 
 285. See Prosecutor v. Kony et al., Case No.ICC-02/04OA, Judgment on the “Decision on 
victims’ applications for participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06, a/0082/06, 
a/0084/06 to a/0089/06, a/0091/06 to a/0097/06, a/0099/06, a/0100/06, a/0102/06 to a/0104/06, 
a/0111/06, a/0113/06 to a/0117/06, a/0120/06, a/0121/06 and a/0123/06 to a/0127/06” of Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, ¶ 1 (Feb. 23, 2009). 
 286. See Prosecutor v. Nourain & Jamus, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09-344-Anx, Decision of the 
Plenary of the Judges on the “Defence Request for the Disqualification of a Judge” of 2 April 2012, 
¶¶ 9 & 33 (June 5, 2012). 
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This Article does not contend that national bias will affect judging in 
all cases. However, judges are unlikely to act as true representatives of the 
international community in cases involving crimes allegedly committed by 
or against their fellow nationals, and judges will be under direct or indirect 
pressure to rule in accordance with domestic considerations in other cases 
that strongly implicate the interests of their states. ICTs should also 
recognize that the parties to a conflict will be less likely to challenge the 
legitimacy of international criminal trials if judges do not participate in 
trials in which their nations have a substantial stake.  
The ICTR and ICTY were perceived to be political courts from their 
inception and may not have been in a position to acknowledge nationality-
based challenges to the impartiality of their judges.287 However, 
international criminal justice has advanced such that recourse to the ICC is 
no longer considered especially controversial.288 The ICC and future ICTs, 
unlike the ad hoc tribunals, can acknowledge that judges are not always 
impervious to the interests of their states.   
The ICC and future ICTs should not place judges in the position of 
having to represent the international community in cases involving crimes 
allegedly committed by or against their fellow nationals. Judges should 
also consider recusing themselves in other cases that substantially 
implicate the interests of their states. A belief in international criminal 
justice is not incompatible with the recognition that judges’ national 
allegiances do not entirely dissipate once they assume the robes of office.  
 
 
 287. This is because the ICTY and ICTR were created by the Security Council to prosecute 
specific crimes. See Jose E. Alvarez, Accounting for Accountability, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
1003, 1014 (1999) (“[W]hile the ad hoc tribunals do not represent ‘victor’s justice,’ the circumstances 
of their creation, as well as the limits to their jurisdiction, have undermined their claim to apolitical 
neutrality.”); see also Mikas Kalinauskas, Comment, The Use of International Military Force in 
Arresting War Criminals: The Lessons of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 383, 425 (2002) (noting that the ICTY established an outreach office 
in Serbia to explain the apolitical nature of its work).  
 288. The fact that the ICC was created by treaty also makes it less susceptible to claims that it is a 
political court. See Alvarez, supra note 287, at 1014. But see Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, Justice 
Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL. 583, 612–13 (2007) (suggesting that the ICC can never be completely apolitical).  
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